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The prevalence of obesity in the developed world has more than doubled over the last 30
years with disproportionate burden of weight falling on the lower income groups. In our
first chapter, we argue that advances in food technology, which have made food abun¬
dant, available and cheap, have also made obesity a problem of self-control. We then
develop a model of self-control which can explain the inverse socioeconomic gradient of
obesity. We argue that whereas the payoffs to simple temptations of palatable foods
are independent of income, people's underlying wellbeing, such as the utility of their
everyday 'sensible' life, is increasing in income. This implies that the relative payoffs
to the temptations of energy-rich, palatable food, compared to the underlying wellbe¬
ing, may be higher for lower income groups, which reduces their incentive to exercise
self-control, and leads to higher rates of obesity. Our model is based on the premise
that people can make systematic mistakes, which we represent through introduction of
a second myopic self. Further, the propensity for systematic mistakes is endogenously
determined. Based on evidence from psychology, we argue that exercise of self-control
is costly in the short run, but increases the stock of willpower and so reduces the
propensity for systematic mistakes in the long run. Incorporating the short-term vs.
long term dynamics of willpower and allowing individuals to endogenously affect their
self-control ability is the secondary objective of the chapter.
In the second chapter, we develop a model of job autonomy, human capital and
self-control which aims to explain the effect of different types of occupations on self-
control outcomes, which is distinct from the pure income effect of wages. Jobs differ in
the degree of autonomy placed on the worker. We argue that successful performance in
autonomous jobs requires the kind of human capital, acquiring which demands exercise
of self-control in the first place. Accumulating such human capital then has spill¬
over effects on individual's level of willpower in other areas of his life. We show that
an increase in the degree of job autonomy in fact increases the steady state levels of
willpower, self-control and human capital. Increasing the return to human capital has
a similar effect. We also find an upper bound for marginal cost of self-control for which
a small increase in autonomy increases agents' experienced welfare in steady state.
In the third chapter, we re-visit the hyperbolic discounting view of self-control by
extending the Benabou and Tirole's "Willpower and Personal Rules", (2004), model to
explore intergenerational links in self-control outcomes. Benabou and Tirole build a self-
signaling model of personal rules based on self-reputation, in which people are uncertain
about their underlying willpower type but can infer it from their own past actions.
However, in equilibrium of their model, full spectrum of self-control outcomes can be
achieved depending on agents' initial beliefs, which remain exogenous. In this chapter,
we put their self-signaling model in the dynamic overlapping generations context, which
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provides a mechanism for the formation of initial beliefs and generates heterogeneous
behaviour among agents of the same type driven by different parental choices. We show
that, conditional on type, children of parents who exercised more self-control during
their lifetime, have higher self-confidence, exercise more self-control themselves and are
at least ex ante better off. We find that this heterogeneity persists from two to infinite
generations set-up with the long run fraction of population exercising self-control being
lower with the influence of parental behaviour than without. Introduction of parental
altruism retains the heterogeneity of children's behaviour but also induces parents to




Why Obesity Weighs on the Poor: A
Model of Self-Control
Abstract
The prevalence of obesity in the developed world has more than doubled over the last
30 years with disproportionate burden of weight falling on the lower income groups. In our
first chapter, we argue that advances in food technology, which have made food abundant,
available and cheap, have also made obesity a problem of self-control. We then develop a
model of self-control which can explain the inverse socioeconomic gradient of obesity. We
argue that whereas the payoffs to simple temptations of palatable foods are independent of
income, people's underlying wellbeing, such as the utility of their everyday 'sensible' life, is
increasing in income. This implies that the relative payoffs to the temptations of energy-rich,
palatable food, compared to the underlying wellbeing, may be higher for lower income groups,
which reduces their incentive to exercise self-control, and leads to higher rates of obesity. Our
model is based on the premise that people can make systematic mistakes, which we represent
through introduction of a second myopic self. Further, the propensity for systematic mistakes
is endogenously determined. Based on evidence from psychology, we argue that exercise of
self-control is costly in the short run, but increases the stock of willpower and so reduces the
propensity for systematic mistakes in the long run. Incorporating the short-term vs. long term
dynamics of willpower and allowing individuals to endogenously affect their self-control ability
is the secondary objective of the chapter.
1 Introduction
One billion people in the world today are estimated to be overweight, with at least 300
million classified as clinically obese (WHO, 2004). Thirty years ago, these numbers
were almost three times lower. The dramatic rise in body weights since the 1980s,
particularly in the developed world, is in sharp contrast to the gentle increase in average
weights which occurred throughout the rest of the 20th century. A hundred years ago,
weights were still largely below the longevity optimum, as the developed countries had
only recently shaken off subsistence poverty, malnutrition and communicable diseases.
The rising body weights at the time were a major source of better health (Fogel, 1994);
in fact, improving the nutrition of the working class was even seen as an important
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part of the growth strategy1. However, since the 1960s in the USA and for the last
three decades in Britain and many other European countries, weights have been rising
above the optimal longevity norm, with the effect of rising weight becoming detrimental
rather than beneficial to health. From the late 1970s to the early 2000s, the prevalence
of obesity in the USA doubled to a level of 30% (Flegal et al, 2002). In Britain, obesity
increased nearly three-fold over the same period to a level of 22.7% (HSE, 2006). This
rise in obesity has been accompanied by a significant rise in obesity-related diseases,
such as type-2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, several types of cancer, musculoskeletal
disorders and gallbladder disease. Large longitudinal studies in the US have shown
that obesity doubles mortality risk (Bray et al, 2008). Yet the distribution of obesity
and its associated health and medical costs is not uniform across the society: obesity
follows an inverse socioeconomic gradient with the heaviest burden falling onto the least
privileged groups.
In this paper, we develop a model of self-control which can explain the socioeconomic
gradient of obesity. We argue that advances in food technology, which have made food
available, easily-accessible, ready-to-eat and cheap, have also made obesity a problem
of self-control. Developed in the times of food insecurity, the human genotype is
maladapted to the conditions of permanent food abundance2; in the current 'obesogenic
environment'3, maintaining a desirable weight requires a conscious and costly effort.
We call this effort self-control. We argue further that whereas the payoffs to simple
temptations, such as indulgence in palatable foods, are independent of income, people's
underlying well-being, such as their enjoyment of a 'sensible' way of life, is increasing
with income4. This makes the payoffs to the temptations of energy-rich palatable foods
relative to the utility of the rest of their everyday 'sensible' lives higher among the poor,
reducing their incentive to put in the self-control effort required to maintain a slender
waistline, and increasing the incentives for weight gain. Thus, our model predicts that
lower income can lead to lower self-control, based on the simple assumption that utility
is increasing in income. This effect is amplified if higher income raises the marginal
return to willpower, but this extra condition is not required to drive our basic result.
We also show how an increase in food abundance can lead to a reduction in self-control
across income groups.
Our model is based on the premise that people can make systematic mistakes; re¬
ducing one's propensity for such mistakes is at the heart of self-control. To represent
^he Food and Agriculture Organisation in the US was created to increase availability of low cost
calorie sources to the working class in the first half of the 20th century.
2Ulijaszek, 2007; Neel at al, 1998
3A term coined by Swinburn et al. (1999) who argue that the physical, economic, social and cultural
environments of the majority of the developed countries encourage a positive energy balance, whereby
the energy value of food consumed exceeds the energy expenditure levels.
4Higher incomes can give people the opportunity to derive utility from 'sensible' goods and activities
which may not be accessible to the lower income groups.
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the propensity for systematic mistakes, we undertake a departure from standard in¬
tertemporal choice models by introducing a myopic second self as a counterpart to the
otherwise rational agent. The rational self is sophisticated in the sense that he under¬
stands the process through which the myopic self might come to make decisions, and
acts to maximise lifetime utility, taking the myopic self into account. Our 'systematic
mistake' interpretation of the second self is in direct parallel to Bernheim and Rangel
(2004). In terms of mathematics, decisions of the rational self correspond to a solution
of an infinite continuous time dynamic programming problem with no uncertainty.
The propensity for systematic mistakes is endogenously determined in our model.
Based on evidence from experimental psychology, we believe that, in addition to being
depleted in the short run, willpower is strengthened in the long run through repeated
use. In terms of short-term effects, experiments by Muraven (1999), Baumeister et
al (1998, 2003, 2005), Vohs and Faber (2007), Vohs and Heatherton (2004) have ex¬
tensively documented a pattern of 'ego depletion', where exercise of self-control on an
initial task impairs the subjects' ability for self-regulation on a subsequent and unre¬
lated task. For the long run effects, the most conclusive evidence that repeated exercise
of self control leads to an improvement in the self-control ability in the long run comes
from a series of experiments by Oaten and Cheng (2006, 2007), in which they show that
a two or four months adherence to an exercise regime or financial monitoring scheme
can improve subjects' performance not only in the experimental self-control tasks, but
also in terms of healthier eating and better studying habits. Thus, we assign a convex
cost to self-control in the short run, but also allow the stock of willpower to accumulate
with exercise of self-control over time. The probability of the myopic self making a
decision, i.e. the probability of a mistake, then declines with willpower. Incorporating
the short-run vs. long-run dynamic properties of willpower, and thereby endowing the
individual with some ability to control his alter ego, is the secondary objective of this
paper.
Although we rely on the dual self terminology, our approach to self-control is quite
different from most of the dual self literature. The focus of this literature is on the
interaction of two distinct systems or selves with distinct preferences or objectives,
where one system can implicitly control the other. In Fudenberg and Levine (2006), it
is the long run self who, at some cost to utility, has the capacity to alter the preferences
and hence behaviour of the successive short run selves. In Benhabib and Bisin (2005), it
is the supervisory function which can use the goal-based controlled processes to override
the initial (emotion-based) response of automatic processes, and is activated if the
consequences of the automatic decision are too costly. In Loewenstein and O'Donoghue
(2007), behaviour is the result of the interaction of deliberative and affective processes,
where both processes can actually influence each other. The fact that one self or
system can alter or 'override' behaviour of the other means that self-control is always
possible in these models, albeit at some cost.
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We take an alternative approach: self-control is not always possible in our modei, as
the individual will continue to make some mistakes; nor can the rational self alter the
behaviour of the myopic self. What the rational self can do is control the frequency with
which myopic decisions are made. This amounts to self-control in our interpretation.
Whether it is the frequency or the nature of the second self/system decisions that the
rational self/system should be able to influence can be subject to debate. Perhaps
it should be both. However, what our approach allows us to do is to incorporate
the intuitive and psychologically supported fact that willpower, although costly in the
short-run, can grow over time. Thus, we allow the individual to get better at self-
control.
We are aware of one other paper to date that explicitly models willpower as a lim¬
ited resource and gives some consideration to the short-run vs. long-run trade-offs.
Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman (2006) consider a canonical single-agent finite cake-
eating problem with the addition of willpower constraint. In their model, moderating
consumption requires willpower but willpower also has an alternative use. This alter¬
native use drives the main the result of model, which lies in generating upward-sloping
consumption paths. Whereas this result is both novel and interesting, the brief refer¬
ence the authors make to the link between wealth and willpower is less convincing. In
particular, they find that two agents who differ only in the size of the initial cake will
have the same absolute level of consumption, but the poorer agent runs out of the cake
sooner and so appears less disciplined. If the initial endowment of the richer agent
is sufficiently large, he would then also have more willpower left for the alternative
activity. We think our intuition, which relies on the difference in relative payoffs of
temptation vs 'sensible' life and does not produce the same consumption between rich
and poor, is more plausible.
2 Obesity: A Rising Problem of Self-Control
"Obesity shows how abundance, through cheapness, variety, novelty, and
choice, could make a mockery of the rational consumer, how it enticed only
in order to humiliate". Avner Offer
The first notable fact behind the obesity problem of the developed world today
is its widespread prevalence: 47.5% of people in Europe and 64% in the USA are
now classified as overweight or obese (HSE, 2006 and Flegal et ah, 2002). Globally,
about 300mln people are estimated to be obese (International Obesity Taskforce, 2004).
The second fact refers to the rate at which obesity has been spreading. In the 2006
Health Survey for England, 24% of adults were classified as obese. Ten years earlier,
the figure was only 17.5% (Fig.la). The third fact is that obesity follows an inverse
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socioeconomic gradient, with the worst burden falling on the least privileged social
groups and ethnic minorities. Already in 1989, Sobal and Stunkard reviewed 144
studies on the prevalence of obesity and found overwhelming evidence for the inverse
association of socioeconomic status and obesity in the developed countries, particularly
among women. Their review has been updated since by Ball and Crawford (2005) and
McLaren (2007) with largely the same findings. Specifically, in their Healthy People
2010 Report, the US Department of Health and Human Services found that in 2002,
higher income level households registered 29% of obesity whereas the low income level
households registered 36%5. The 2006 Health Survey for England showed similar trends
(Fig.lb); women in particular registered a 13% difference in obesity rates between the
highest and the lowest income quintiles6.
Trends in Obesity, England 1993-2006
Year
Men >—Women
Figure la. Rising rates of obesity in England, 1993-2006
5In the US DHSS Healthy People 2010 report, households are classified as 'higher income level' if
their income is greater than 130% of poverty threshold. All other households are classified as 'lower
income level'. A finer partition of the income continuum could give even stronger results.
6In this paper, we do not focus specifically on gender differences in socioeconomic gradient of obesity.
It is a robust finding that women exhibit a steeper socioeconomic gradient, whereas the relationship
for men tends to be less steep and curvilinear, although the overall effect is in the same direction. A
simple explanation for the curvilinear relationship for men is that the lowest ranked occupations still
require a significant amount of physical labour on behalf of men, which could explain why their obesiy
levels drop slightly between the fourth and the fifth income quitiles. The steepness of the women's
gradient is sometimes explained by reference to social norms, however, this is a question for a future
model.
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Figure lb.Obesity over-represneted in lower income groups, especially for women.
What, then, is at the heart of this rise in obesity and why is it overrepresented
among the poor? Obesity is defined as an excess of body adiposity. It is measured
by the Body Mass Index (weight divided by height squared, kg/m2) with BMI in the
range of 25-30 being overweight, and BMI>30 classified as obesity. The basic laws of
thermodynamics dictate that in order to gain weight an individual must experience
a positive imbalance between energy intake and energy outlet. In principle, this is
a simple equation, but the precise reasons why the imbalance changed dramatically
in the 1980s are not fully understood. The analysis is complicated by the fact that
the recent rise in obesity could be explained by as little as an average net increase of
100-150 calories a day (Hill et ah, 2003).
Data on dietary intake in most developed countries tend to show an upward trend.
In the US, dietary surveys and food disappearance data are consistent in indicating
an increase in the caloric intake of 200kcal per day over the last 20 years (Popkin et
al, 2002; Caballero, 2007). Data for Britain show a roughly 250 calorie rise from
1980 to 2003 (WHO, Europe 2005). The increase in calorie consumption has been
attributed to increased consumption of grains, added fats and added sugars (Putnum
et al., 1999); to increased consumption of carbohydrates (Finkelstein et al, 2005); to in¬
creased consumption of sweetened but energy-dilute beverages (DiMeglio et al., 2000),
to increased consumption of energy dense foods (Drewnowski, 2004); to snacking be¬
tween meals (Cutler et al, 2003); to more frequent visits to and increased portions in
fast-food restaurants (French et al., 2000, Nielsen et al, 2003), to increased portions in
full-service restaurants (Chou et al, 2004); also to increased portions at home (Nielsen
et al, 2003); and even to reduction in smoking (Chou et al, 2004). In other words,
although all of these factors and more may contribute to the rise of obesity, the overall
picture is far from clear7.
7Stephen J. Dubner even suggests improvements in the plumbing and lavatory systems as possible
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On the energy output side, the sedentary lifestyle of the US population as well
as many other developed nations, driven by urbanization, changes in transportation
systems and the effects of technological change reducing energy expenditure in the
workplace, no doubt contributes to the energy imbalance. However, most of these
changes pre-date the 1980s and in the US, the sedentary lifestyle was already a concern
in the 1950s when the Council on Fitness and Health was created (Caballero, 2007).
Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) also report that energy expenditure fell substantially
before 1975, but has remained roughly constant thereafter. Thus, the precise effects
of changes in energy expenditure are also hard to quantify.
What does come out clearly from the vast volume of empirical research on obesity
is the fact that food has become abundant, virtually universally available and cheap,
with average food prices rising slower than inflation in both the US and Europe. This
is particularly true of the energy dense and pre-prepared foods as advances in food
processing and storage technology in the 1980s have made sure that these foods have
fallen dramatically in relative price. There is also evidence that diets vary by socioeco¬
nomic class. Lower income groups are believed to consume more grains, added sugars
and fats, and low cost meat (James et al, 1997). Higher income groups tend to consume
more fruit and vegetables (De Irala-Estevez et al., 2000). However, given the price dif¬
ferential between fruit and fats, the typical differences by income tend to be relatively
small. For example, a European study (De Irala-Estevez) found that the difference in
vegetable consumption between the highest and the lowest SES was 17g/person/day
for men and 13g/person/day for women. The fruit figures tend to be a little higher,
but fruit is also much less representative of diet as a whole. In addition, a study by
nearly the same people as the De Irala-Estevez (2000) finds that higher socioeconomic
status is also associated with higher consumption of cheese! (Sanches-Villegas, 2003).
These kind of findings underlie the reasoning behind the most important competing
explanation for the inverse socioeconomic gradient of obesity. The Drewnowski et al.
(2004) hypothesis is that in view of relative prices, the poor income groups cannot
afford a lean diet and instead consume the considerably cheaper alternative of energy
dense foods, which tends to be strongly associated with positive energy imbalance.
Drewnowski shows that energy density and energy cost of food are inversely linked and
argues that "the selection of energy dense foods by the food-insecure or low-income
consumers may represent a deliberate strategy to save money". We believe that whilst
the availability of the low-cost energy dense alternative plays an important role, relative
prices alone do not tell the whole story.
First of all, incomes have risen faster than food costs over the last three decades,
with expenditure on food as proportion of income declining not only on average but
contributing factor to obesity in "The Strangest Factor Yet for Rising Obesity?", NYT, September
17th 2008.
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also across income groups (Offer 2001. Bureau of Labour Statistics). In the UK, the
Food Expenditure Survey indicates that whereas in 1957 food and non-alcoholic drinks
accounted for the highest proportion of weekly expenditure at 33%, by 2007 this figure
was reduced to 15%. Housing expenditure rose from 9% to 19% but did not take up
the full slack from reduced food expenditure. The greatest proportional rise has in
fact been seen in leisure services, which rose from 6% in 1978 to 15% in 2006. This
suggest that the food constraint cannot be more binding today than 30 years ago.
Second, rich in added fats and sugars, energy dense food is not only cheap, it is
also highly palatable. It is a standard finding that foods that are energy-dense provide
more sensory enjoyment and pleasure than other types of foods (Drewnowski, 1997,
1999; Mela, 1999). Clinical studies also suggest that the most likely targets of food
cravings are those foods that contain fat, sugar or both (Yanovski, 2003). This leads
us to the more general argument: the abundance of energy-rich palatable food is an
incredibly recent phenomenon in the scale of humanity's nearly 200,000 year history,
most of which, or at least what we know of it, had been characterised by food scarcity.
At times of such scarcity, a preference for energy dense food may have represented an
evolutionary advantage (Friedman 1992, Drewnowski, 1995). Fat storing or 'overcon-
sumption' when food was available could have been viewed as a strategy against the
times of food insecurity. However, in the age of dietary abundance, such 'thrifty geno¬
type' preference can lead to overeating and, ultimately, obesity (Blundell et al, 1996).
For most people, with 'normal' metabolic rates and typical rates of physical activity,
not eating oneself into weight gain today requires effort - it requires self-control.
In our view, the problem of self-control lies at the heart of the obesity issue. Indeed,
an informed individual with no self-control problem would have no trouble staying thin -
he could simply eat less, just enough to maintain the energy balance. However, anyone
who has ever tried to lose weight knows well that there is nothing simple about eating
less. The estimated $40-$100 billion revenues of the current American dieting industry
are but one testament to the difficulty of maintaining a desirable weight (Cutler et
ah, 2003). Additionally, as well as affecting the poor and the racial minorities, the
increase in obesity falls heavily on the right tail of the weight distribution, with already
obese people getting disproportionately more obese (Graham and Felton, 2005). This
observation offers further support to the self-control hypothesis as people on the right
tail of the BMI distribution are already likely to have self-control problems, which would
only be exacerbated by the recent developments in the supply of palatable energy-dense
foods.
We thus adopt the view that the developments in technology that made food abun¬
dant, available and cheap, have also made obesity a problem of self-control. We then
develop a model which can explain why low income households can end up with lower
self-control in equilibrium. The underlying intuition is that the payoff to over-eating
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is more or less constant across individuals and independent of wealth, but the overall
well-being is increasing in income. Thus, the relative benefit of over-eating compared
to that of 'healthy' lifestyle is lower for the higher income groups, making over-eating
relatively less attractive.
This is not to say that the poor are to blame for the obesity problem. We do not
argue that they make 'bad' choices or have 'wrong' preferences. We argue that their
response to the new food environment is rational, as is their decision to accumulate
less willpower. However, we also do not argue that this is First Best. A welfare
improvement could still be achieved by changing the food environment and reducing
the cost of self-control.
3 The Model
In this model, we consider an infinitely-lived agent comprised of two selves: a rational,
forward looking self and a myopic alter ego. At any point in time, where time is
infinite and continuous, one of the selves is chosen to act; the rational self is selected
with probability p(X(t)), where X(t) is his stock of willpower. If chosen, the rational
self decides how much self-control activity, I(t), to perform. Self-control is effortful
and therefore carries a cost, e(/(t)). However, by engaging in self-control the rational
self can replenish his stock of willpower, which, if left unused, depreciates at rate
S. This has two effects: first, the utility of the rational self, u(X(t),y), is itself an
increasing function of willpower; second, having a higher stock of willpower increases
the probability that the rational self is chosen to act in the first place, p(X(t)) is
increasing in X{t). Since one of the main objectives of this paper is to investigate the
relationship between income and self-control, we also include income, y, in the utility
function; in this chapter, income enters as a parameter. Thus, the net instantaneous
utility of the rational self is u(X(t),y)— e(I(t)). If the myopic self is chosen, which
happens with probability 1 - p(X(t)), he foregoes any attempt at self-control and
instead engages in temptation activity, which yields instantaneous utility, u(m), where
m is the temptation payoff to the myopic self, assumed to be constant.8
This formulation is somewhat abstract in the sense that we do not specify exactly
what constitutes a self-control activity. We argue that everyday life can be viewed
as a sequence of self-control decisions: from getting up early to exercise before work,
through foregoing the office snacks to not leaving the last piece of work till the morning
8These assumptions put a particular structure on our model. The rational and myopic selves
essentially have different choice sets. This structure adds to mathematical simplicity of our approach
but is not overly restrictive. Although the rational self cannot choose to engage in temptation directly,
he can choose to reduce the stock of willpower and thus increase the probability the myopic self will
choose temptation for him in the future.
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after, self-control is required for a majority of everyday decisions. Thus, the variable
I[t) in our model captures how much self-restraint the rational part of the agent chooses
to exert on any given occasion. The collection of such self-control decisions can be seen
as investment into willpower. We argue further that willpower has a direct effect on
agent's (instantaneous) utility. A higher amount of willpower allows the individual to
carry out his plans and achieve his goals, undertake and complete long-term projects
from acquiring education, to reaching a healthy compromise in marriage or holding
on to a job. All of these translate into greater wellbeing (see numerous works by
Oswald et al); in fact, much of the economics of happiness shows that variables such as
marriage and employment have the most significant effect on happiness; their effect is
also considerably greater in magnitude than that of income (Blanchflower and Oswald,
2002). We capture the effect of the major non-monetary, self-control related variables
on happiness by introducing willpower, X(t), into the utility function, u(X(t),y)9.
We make the following assumptions about the payoff and cost functions:
Assumption 1
1. The instantaneous payofffunction u(X, y) is concave in X , with limx-
du(X, •)
oo and limx^oo —rrr;— = 0oX
2. The probability function p(X) is concave in X, with p(0) = 0 and limx
1.
3. The cost function e(I) is convex in /, bounded and e'(I) is bounded above.
Moreover, u(X,y), p(X) and e(I) are all C^2\
The Inada conditions in the first part of this assumption help us get rid of the un¬
necessary Lagrange multipliers. The second part simply ensures that the probability
lies between zero and one. The third part captures what is perhaps the most docu¬
mented psychological insight about self-control: in the short run, exercising self-control
is effortful and becomes progressively more difficult the more self-control is required.
We represent this observation with a convex cost of self-control. Notice that this is
not exactly the same as Baumeister's argument that repeated self-control tasks weaken
one's self-control 'ability' in the short run; nevertheless, our intuition is similar, al¬
though we prefer the interpretation of increasing cost of self-control effort. The second
psychological insight we incorporate is that in the long run, repeated exercise of self-
control can strengthen the individual's willpower reserves, which in our model leads to
9 As a robustness check, we can respecify the model so that utility is a function of income alone,
u(y), and willpower enters into the cost of self-control, e(I,X), with ex(I,X) < 0 and eIX(I,X) < 0.
In this case, greater willpower reduces the cost of self-control, which is still in line with Baumeister






an increase in p(X(t)), which is an increase in the proportion of time the rational self
is 'in control'.
The rational self is sophisticated insofar as he acts like a standard rational expected
utility maximiser, taking into account that, with probability 1 — p(X (t)), the myopic
self will be making decisions at any point t in the future. The rational self discounts
the future exponentially at rate r. Thus, the objective of the rational self is to choose
the optimal rate of self-control to maximise his discounted lifetime utility subject to
the equation of motion for willpower:
roc
max/ \p{X(t)) [u(X(t),y) - e(I(t))} + (1 - p(X(t))) u(m)\ e~rtdt (3.1)1 Jo
s.t. X{t) = p(X(t))I(t) - 6X(t), X(0) = X0, X(t) > 0
It is worth drawing attention to how the formulation of this objective function was
arrived at. Suppose time were infinite but discrete; then in every period t, one of
the selves would be called upon to make the decision with probability p(X(t)). As
we take the continuous limit, we assume that the frequency with which decisions are
being made is increasing at the same rate with which the time intervals are becoming
shorter. In the limit, it's as if the agent were making decisions infinitely frequently.
We can therefore write down lifetime utility as the average between the rational and the
myopic selves' payoffs, weighted by the respective probabilities of each selves taking the
decision. This would be the standard modelling approach in macroeconomics, although
one could argue that time intervals could decrease at one rate and decision times could
arrive at a different rate, following some stochastic process, for example. The obvious
advantage of our approach is that it adds greatly to tractability, and we do not believe
that complicating the decisions rate would qualitatively alter our predictions.
The willpower constraint in (3.1), reflects the idea that only the rational self will ex¬
ercise self-control and replenish the stock of willpower, but the depreciation of willpower
occurs regardless of which self is in control. Since we treat willpower as a stock, its
value should not be negative. It is easy to see that the X(t) > 0 constraint is not
binding because it can never be optimal for the agent to choose X(t) = 0 for any t as
, i du(Xr)
our assumptions on the payoff function, namely lim^—o —^— = oo, ensure that if
X = 0, an infinitesimally small increase in X would lead to an infinitely large increase
in marginal payoff. We do not restrict the value of I(t) to the positive domain so the
agent is permitted to disinvest in willpower. Thus, there will be no Lagrange multiplier
associated with I(t) and the multiplier for X(t) will be zero.
In its simplified form, Problem 3.1 can we re-written as follows10:
10We have dropped the time subscribts since this is an infinite horizon optimal control problem in
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POO
V(X) = max \p(X)(u(X,y) — e(I) - u(m)) + u(m)\e~rtdt (3.2)1 Jo
s.t. X = p(X)I - SX, X(0) = X0
Consider the expression u(X, y) — e(I) — u(m), which is in the objective functional
of (3.2). This expression is the difference between the net payoffs to self-control.
U(X, y) — e(I), and to temptation. u(m). The economically interesting case is the one
in which the long term benefits to self-control are greater than those to temptation.
Otherwise, the rational self could run his willpower reserves down to zero, let the myopic
self be always in control and always engage in temptation. This is not impossible, but
neither is it interesting or plausible. Thus, we assume that for any 'reasonable' cost of
self-control, the steady state payoff to self-control exceeds the payoff to temptation.
Assumption 2 In steady state,
1. u(Xs,y) — e(Is) > u(m),
2. 5- Isp'(Xs) > 0.
The second part of this assumption states that the slope of the X isocline at steady
Q r v'(X^)I^
state, = —p(x$)—' sh°uld be positive. This means that self-control is increasing
with willpower along the X = 0 path, so that maintaining a steady state with higher
willpower requires more self-control. In principle, it is possible to have the opposite
sign, so that higher willpower leads to less self-control in steady state. This could arise
if p(X) was rising sufficiently quickly to compensate for the fall in I. We think the
case where the rational self gains control at such at rate that he needs to exert less and
less self-control effort as he accumulates willpower is not particularly plausible, so we
assume it away.
Proposition 1.1 Under Assumption 1, the solution of the rational agent's optimisa¬
tion problem approaches a steady state. Under additional Assumption 2, this steady
state is an asymptotically unstable saddle point if,
m p iv) nvd only if• < 2ux(xs,y) ' y 1
„ n . (r+6-p'(Xs)Is)(5-p'(Xs)Is)e"(Is)
• 2p'{X0)ux{X°,y) <
((u(Xs,y) -e{Is) -u(m) + e'(Is)Is)p"(Xs) + p{Xs)uxx(Xs, y))
which time does not enter as an independent variable.
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of the necessary and sufficient con¬
ditions of the infinite time optimal control theory.
Step 1. Write down the current value Hamiltonian with the necessary conditions,
and confirm existence:
H(X,I,X) =p(X) [u(X, y) — e{I) — u(m)] + u(m) + X(p(X)I — 5X) (3.3)
dH
— = -p{X) (e'(J) - A) = 0 (3.4)
dH
A = rX= (r+5-p'(X)I)X-p'(X) [u(X,y) - e{I) - u(m)\-p(X)ux(X,y) (3.5)
X = p(X)I — 5X (3.6)
lim e~rtH(X, 7, A) = 0 (3.7)
t—too
First, we check that the necessary transversality condition (3.7) is satisfied. Define a
vector ofmodel parameters and initial conditions <f> = (p.Xo) = (5, r, m, y.Xo). Assume
there exists a solution of the necessary conditions (3.4)-(3.6), which we denote by
{X*(t, cj)),I*(t, (/>)), and a corresponding current value costate variable A(t, 4>), with the
property that (X*(t, (p),I*(t, (f>)) —> (Xs(p), Is(p)) as t —> oo, where (Xs(p), Is(p)) is the
simple steady state solution of the same necessary conditions. We can see from equation
(3.4) that A = e'(/); since by Assumption 1, the RHS is bounded and continuous at
(Xs(p),Is(p)), we can say that A —> As as t —•> oo. Then, consider the infinite time
limit of the Hamiltonian:
lim H(X*, r, A*) = lim (p(X*) [u(X*, y) - e(/*) - u(m)\ + u(m) + X*(p(X*)I* - 6X*))
t—>oo t—>oo
= p(Xs) [u(Xs, y) - e(Is) - u(m)] + u{m) + As(p(Xs)Is - SXs) = const.
Since linp^oo H(X*,I*, A*) exists, we can confirm that
lim e~rtH(X*,r, A*) - lim e~rt lim H(X*,I*,X*) = 0
t—>oo t—>oo t—>oo
Next, we need to confirm that Mangasarian sufficient conditions are satisfied and so
the solution to the necessary conditions is in fact the solution to Problem (3.2). The
sufficient conditions in question are that the Hamiltonian, H(X,I,X) is concave along
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the (Apath11, and that lim^oo e~rt[X(t, 4>)(X*(t, (fr) — X(f))] < 0. Since
we have assumed that as t -> oo, X*(t,</>) -► Xs{p),A-» A5(p), /9(t,0) -* (3s(p)
and because all admissible paths of X(t) are bounded, the second sufficient condition
is satisfied with equality. To check for concavity of the Hamiltonian, we need to
confirm that the Hessian matrix for the Hamiltonian is a negative semi definite, i.e.
its eigenvalues are non-positive. With A(t) = e'(I(t))\/t 6 [0,oo), from (3.4), the
eigenvalues can be written as:
^ = ~p(X)e"(I) (3.8)
^2 = (u(Xs, y) - e(Is) - u(m) + e'(Is)Is)p"(Xs) + 2p'(Xs)ux(Xs, y) + p(Xs)uxx(Xs, y)
It is clear from (3.8) that v\ = —p{X)e"{I) <0. A sufficient condition for < 0
is that Pp(xS) < 2uX{xs y) • '^'s we see, this is the same sufficient condition that
guarantees that the determinant of the Jacobian of the steady state system is negative.
If this sufficient condition holds, then the Hamiltonian is in fact strictly concave and
the solution is unique.
Step 2. Solve the necessary conditions to find a system of differential equations in
(XX).
After differentiating the first order condition (3.4) with respect to time and substi¬
tuting into (3.5) we get the following system:
X = p{X)I — 8X (3.9)
• -p'(X)(u(X, y) - e(J) - u{m)) + e'(I)(6 + r - p'(X)I) - p(X)ux(X, y) ,o i n,I- e"(T) ^'iUj
The steady state occurs when X — 0 and I — 0 :
p{Xs)Is - SXS = 0 (3.11)
-p'(XS)(u(XS, y) - e(IS) - u(m)) + e'(IS)(S + r - p'(Xs)Is) - p(Xs)ux(Xs, y) = 0
(3.12)
Step 3. Find the Jacobian of the system (3.9)-(3.10) and ascertain the local stability
of the dynamic system evaluated at steady state.
11 Technically, it is the Lagrangian that should be concave, but since the only Lagrange multiplier in




Looking at the trace of the Jacobian, Tr(J(Xs,Is)) = r > 0, we can immediately
conclude that at least one of the eigenvalues is positive, therefore ruling out asymptotic
local stability of the steady state. However, if we can show that the determinant of
the Jacobian is negative, that would necessarily mean that the second eigenvalue is





.ax oi {x=o, /=0)
S\ tS-S + p'{Xb)r
T^[(u{Xb,y) - e(r) - u(m) + e'(Is)Is)p"(Xs)
+2p'(XS)ux(XS, y) + p(XS)uxJXS, y)\
Det[J{Xs,r)} = -(r + 5-p'{Xs)Is)(8-p'(Xs)Is) + (3.14)
p{Xs)[(u(Xs ,y)-e(Is)-u(m)+e'(Is)Is)p" (Xs)+2p'(Xs)un-jXs ,y)+p{Xs)uxx(Xs ,y)}
e"(Is)
To ascertain the sign of the determinant, let's first have a closer look at the steady
state condition (3.12). By Assumption 2, the second part of the first term (u(Xs, y) —
e(Is) — m) > 0. In addition, all of p(Xs), p'(Xs), ux(Xs, y) > 0. Then, the first and
the third term of expression (3.12) are both negative, meaning that the second term has
to be positive, which implies that 5 + r — p'{Xs)Is > 0. Thus, using Assumption 2, we
can establish that the first term in Det[J(Xs, Is)] is always negative. Recalling that
e"(J) > 0 (from convexity), whereas p"{X) < 0, uxx(X, •) < 0 (from concavity), we can
see that the determinant is negative whenever 2p'(Xs)ux(Xs,y) +p(Xs)uxx(Xs, y) <
—u (x^ ty)
0. Rearranging the last expression, we get JxS) < 2u*{xs y) ' is a sufficient
condition for the steady state to be a locally asymptotically unstable saddle point.
It is convenient algebraically but is considerably stronger than what is required for a
negative determinant.
The necessary condition is
2p'(X°)«,(Xs,y) < W<
((«(A -s,y)-e(/s) - u(m)+ e'(Is)Is)p"(X+ ,
which is just a rearrangement of (3.14). ■
The sufficient condition of Proposition 1.1 is neat and carries a simple meaning. It
states that the rate of increase of the probability function with respect to willpower is
less than half the rate of decrease in marginal utility with respect to willpower. This
is in parallel to the second part of Assumption 2, namely that the A = 0 isocline is
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upward sloping at steady state, which can also be simplified to ^xsj ^ x^' This last
expression states that the rate of increase of probability with willpower is bounded above
by the reciprocal of willpower. Thus, both Assumption 2 and the sufficient condition of
Proposition 1.1 demand that the probability of the rational self being in control does not
rise too quickly with willpower; otherwise the rational self may not have the sufficient
incentive to invest into willpower by exercising self-control. This seems reasonable
enough and it is easy to find functions that would satisfy these conditions12. It is
important to remember though that this sufficient condition is considerably stronger
than what is necessary to guarantee that the steady state is a saddle point. The
necessary condition in Proposition 1.1 is far more relaxed, but it also does not lend
itself easily to a natural interpretation. Still, we present both for the sake of interest.
The steady state is depicted in Fig.2. The one stable manifold that leads to the
steady state has the following properties. If an individual is endowed with high amount
of willpower to start with, the optimal path dictates that the individual should disinvest
in self-control to drive down willpower to its steady state level. In this case, the stock of
willpower declines monotonically until the steady state level is reached. For example,
if an individual has had a very strict parental upbringing, he can afford to 'loosen
up' and would still reach the steady state. In fact, if an individual complements the
initially high endowment of willpower with excessive self-control efforts, he could spiral
off into a 'control freak state', forever increasing both self-control efforts and willpower
stock. Such out-of-equilibrium behaviour could potentially represent conditions such
as anorexia, etc.
I
Figure 2. Phase Diagram for Steady State.
If, on the other hand, the initial endowment of willpower is low, the individual
should start off investing heavily in self-control, gradually decreasing investment as he
12We were able to simulate the model and find the steady state with simple power functions.
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approaches the steady state. In this case, the stock of willpower will rise monotonically
until the steady state is reached. Thus, our model suggests that an individual who
has had a very relaxing childhood, should compensate for his low willpower stock by
adopting a strict approach to self-control, straight away. With time, he can afford to
relax some of his control rules, but the initial investment must be high. Otherwise,
individual runs the risk of ending up in the "no self-control state" with both self-control
efforts and willpower tending towards zero.
3.1 Discussion
One of the main goals of this paper is to establish a relationship between income and
self-control. We begin by examining the case in which the payoff to temptation activity
does not depend on income. This case is most applicable to temptations such as over¬
eating (or smoking) and thus also to the obesity trends that we aim to explain.
Proposition 1.2 When the size of temptation payoff is independent of income and
with Assumptions 1 and 2, the steady state levels of self-control and willpower are
increasing in income if:
1. Independence: uxy(X,y) — 0, or
2. Complementarity: uxy(X,y) > 0, or
3. Substitution: uxy(X,y) < 0 and \uxy(X, y)\ <








-[('u(Xs, y) - e(Is) - «(m) + e'(Is)Is)p"(Xs)




This Jacobian is almost exactly the same as J{XS, Is) and in fact, Det[Js{Xs, Is)} =
e"(Is)Det[J(Xs,Is)\- Therefore, Det[Js(Xs, Is)] < 0 under the conditions of Propo¬
sition 1.
Step 2. To find the effect of a change in income on the steady state, we totally






dX 81 dy dy
dis dis d Is dls
-dX ~dT. . dy . - dy .
(3.16)
0















We have already established that the denominator is negative for both (3.17) and
fly.5 ars
(3.18). Since p(X5) > 0 and (5-p'(Xs)Is) > 0, the sign of both —— and —— is deter-
dy dy
mined by the sign of the expression (p'(Xs)uy(Xs, y) + p(Xs)uxy(Xs, y)). In line with
conventional economic theory, we assume that the marginal utility of income, uy(Xs, y),
is positive; it is clear, therefore, that (p'(Xs)uy(Xs,y) + p(Xs)uxy(Xs, y)) > 0 for all
X,y as long as uxy(Xs,y)) > 0 or uxy(Xs, y)) < 0 and \uxy{X,y)\ < ^juy(X,y). m
Let's consider each case in turn.
Independence. This is the simplest and perhaps the most important result of this
model. All that is needed for steady state self-control and willpower to be increasing
with income is that marginal utility of income is positive, which is a rather simple
assumption. The intuition for this result comes from the idea that the payoffs to
'temptation' activities such as over-eating or smoking are independent of income but
the utility of the rational self is increasing in income. In other words, an individual's
enjoyment of the 'sensible' or rational way of life is rising with income. Therefore, for
any given level of willpower and self-control, temptation yields a lower relative payoff
compared to self-control for people at higher wealth levels, making it relatively less
attractive. Notice that this is not the same as saying the rich have a higher payoff to
self-control - we have just assumed that marginal benefit of self-control is independent
of income. Instead, we are saying that because the poor enjoy lower well-being by
nature of lower income, simple temptations such as overeating are more attractive to
them.
Complementarity. In this case the cross-partial derivative is positive, uxy(Xs,y) >
0, and willpower and wealth reinforce each other so that exerting self-control is more
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effective at higher levels of wealth and vice versa. For example, it is easy to imagine
that increasing an individual's willpower so that he has the patience to study harder
and at the same time increasing his income so he can afford a good school would have a
positive effect on his welfare. This is in fact the case when marginal utility of willpower
is rising with income so that the rich have a greater payoff to self-control.
Substitution. When the cross-partial derivative is negative, uxy(Xs,y)) < 0, so that
income and willpower act as substitutes, a rise in income would allow an individual to
reduce his stock of willpower and still stay at the same level of utility. In this case, if
the substitution effect is sufficiently large, an increase in income would lead to a lower
self-control steady state. The intuition then is that the poor can compensate for their
lack of income by building up the stock of willpower, whereas the rich could substitute
their wealth for the self-control effort. More so, one could imagine a utility function
for which the cross derivative is negative but its modulus is growing in y. Then, for
most income levels, the standard result of higher income leading to higher willpower in
steady state would hold. However, after some critical level of y, an increase in income
would actually reduce equilibrium willpower and self-control. This could perhaps
explain why some people at very high income levels engage in habits incompatible with
well-developed willpower.
The question of whether income and willpower act as complements or substitutes
is open for debate, and insofar as utility functions might differ across individuals, this
could be treated as a source of heterogeneity. The Heckman approach offers strong
support for complementarity, but it is also plausible that, particularly at very high
wealth levels, the substitution effect might take over. Still, our strongest result so far
does not depend on the cross-partial relationship between wealth and willpower, as in
the case of independence, a rise in income has an unambiguously positive effect on the
steady state.
3.2 Temptation Increasing with Income
Some temptations are increasing with income. It is easy to imagine that the higher
income groups, with their superior resources, have access to more ways of 'wasting
money'. Expensive shopping trips, state of the art cars or electronics, exotic travel
destinations are whims available only to the well-off.
Proposition 1.3 When the size of the temptation payoff is increasing in income,
m'(y) > 0, and the sufficient conditions of Proposition 1.1 hold, the steady state levels
of self-control and willpower are increasing in income whenever:
1. Independence: uxy{X,y) - 0 and u'(m)m'{y) < uy{Xs,y), or
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2. Complementarity: uxy(X,y) > 0 and u'{m)m'{y) < uy{Xs,y) + j^uxy(X,y),
or
3. Substitution: uxy(X,y) < 0 and u'{m)m'{y) +^ \uxy{X,y)\ < uy(X,y).
Proof is analogous to Proposition 1.2 with one extra derivative and is therefore
omitted.
Proposition 1.3 says that the steady state is increasing with income under the
conditions of Proposition 1.2 and one extra clause: the temptation utility should not
rise too quickly with income. Under independence, if an increase in income raises the
utility of the rational self by more than the temptation utility of the myopic self, the
steady state levels of self-control and willpower also increase. Thus, an individual now
only moves to a higher steady state if the marginal effect of income on the enjoyment
of sensible life exceeds the marginal effect on enjoyment of temptation. This may
explain why many lottery winners squander their winnings in the first few years and
rarely significantly improve their long term well-being. The benchmark condition is
somewhat relaxed under complementarity since the extra income augments marginal
utility of willpower. With substitution, on the other hand, this benchmark is tightened
since the extra income can be substituted for willpower, creating an incentive to lower
willpower and self-control.
3.3 Abundance and Obesity
We have argued that advances in the food technology that made rich, energy-dense
food abundant, readily-available and often ready-to-eat, have turned obesity into a
problem of self-control. It is a common observation in the self-control literature that
proximity of temptations or cues associated with it, make such temptation more difficult
to resist. In the set-up of our model, it is reasonable to suggest that a dramatic rise
in the availability of food has increased the cost of self-control. We augment the e(/)
function to e(/, a), where a is the abundance parameter. We assume that abundance
creates an upwards shift in the cost of self-control function, eQ(Is, a) > 0, and increases
the marginal cost of self-control, eja(Is ,a) > 0.
Proposition 1.4 Under the sufficient conditions of Proposition 1.1, a rise in a lowers
the steady state levels of willpower and self-control.
Proof. Using the steady state Jacobian of Proposition 2, having replaced e(I) with
e(I,a),we solve the following system
~dXs dXs~ \dXs-\ dXs~
dX dl da da
ois dls dis dis
1




= v{xSW(XS)ea(Is, a) + {r + 5- p'{Xs)Is)eJa(Is, a))
da Det[Js(Xs,Is)\ (3'2°)
dP
= (S - P'ixS)IS)(,p'{Xs)ea{Is, a) + (r + S - p'(Xs)Is)eIa{Is, a))
Def[J5(Xs,P)] (3'21)
Recall that Z)et[Js'(Xs, 7s)] < 0. Then since eQ(/'s',a) > 0 and eIa(Is,a) > 0, we
dXs 81s
can conclude that —— < 0 and <0 ■
oa da
Thus, our model predicts that an increase in the availability of food should move
an individual to a lower steady state, regardless of wealth level, but for a given level
of abundance (a fixed as in previous section), the lower income groups would end up
with lower willpower. Notice that although we think it makes sense to assume that
both ea(Is,a) > 0 and eja(Is,a) > 0, either one of these effects is actually sufficient
for willpower to decline with abundance.
4 Evidence from Experimental Psychology
"When a person trains once, nothing happens. When a person forces
himself to do a thing a hundred or a thousand times, then he certainly
has developed in more ways than physical. Is it raining? That doesn't
matter. Am I tired? That doesn't matter, either. Then willpower will be
no problem." Emil Zatopek
The idea that self-control is depleted in the short-run by repeated use finds con¬
sistent support in a wealth of experimental evidence. The pattern of 'ego depletion',
whereby exerting some self-control effort on the first task weakened the subjects' ability
to perform self-regulation on subsequent tasks, has been documented by Baumeister
and colleagues in a multitude of experiments, with different manipulations and mea¬
sures of self-regulation. For example, in Muraven et al. (1998) it was found that the
group of people required to engage in thought-suppression exercises in the first part
of the experiment gave up on solving (unsolvable) anagrams in the second part of the
experiment significantly earlier than the group for which no thought suppression had
been required. The exercise in thought suppression also led the subjects to be signifi¬
cantly less able to inhibit their emotional responses to a video clip. In Baumeister et
al (1998), it was found that the subjects who had to resist the temptation to eat the
chocolate cookies that had been laid out in front of them gave up significantly sooner on
the subsequent geometric puzzle task than the participants that had not been subjected
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to the cookie test. Since then, it has been shown that self-regulation on some initial
task weakened the ability to solve reasoning problems (Schmeichel, Vohs, Baumeister,
2003), made people more prone to impulsive purchasing and spending higher amounts in
unanticipated buying situations (Vohs and Faber, 2007), increased likelihood of aggres¬
sive behaviour (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007), increased likelihood of
inappropriate sexual behaviour (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). Vohs and Heatherton
(2000) also showed that dieters were less able to stick to their diets once they had been
exposed to a prior self-control task.
The experiments described above and other similar procedures strongly point to the
conclusion that "self-control is impaired in the aftermath of using it" (Baumeister and
Vohs, 2007). However, it should be noted that subjects did not simply 'run out' of their
self-control stock - rather they were more unwilling to use it. Muraven (1998) found
that with sufficiently high incentives subjects were able to exercise self-regulation even
after several trials of self-control tasks. One implication of this finding is the support
for our modelling of self-control exhaustion as an increase in the cost of the self-control
effort. Further, Muraven found support for the idea that people actively 'conserve' their
self-control 'energy'. In another experiment, during the second self-regulation task, a
group of subjects were told that there was a third task pending. This group showed
the biggest decline in self-regulation on the second task. Moreover, their performance
on the third task was inversely proportional to how much effort they spent on the
second task. In other words, subjects appeared to act strategically with respect to
their depleted willpower.
The experimental evidence on the long run properties of willpower has now also
come to light, and it is strongly in support of the idea that practising self-control
in the short run can strengthen self-control ability, or willpower, in the longer term.
First evidence came from an experiment by Muraven, Baumeister and Tice (1999),
which required the treatment subjects to spend 2 weeks performing one of three self-
control tasks: monitoring and improving posture, regulating mood or monitoring and
recording eating. A control group, not required to practice anything, was also included.
To identify any changes in the self-control capacity, these students participated in the
thought suppression and hand-grip tasks at the beginning and end of the two week
period. It was found that the exercising subjects, aside from those engaged in mood
regulation, performed significantly better on the hand-grip task at the end of the two
weeks than the non-exercising control group. The interpretation of this finding is
complicated by the fact that the results were relative and the control group actually got
worse at the self-control task. Nevertheless, the study provides preliminary evidence
that self-control could be strengthened with exercise.
A number of studies by Oaten and Cheng provide more conclusive evidence. In
the 2006 version of the experiment, Oaten and Cheng first measured the subjects' ego
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depletion between a thought suppression exercise and their subsequent performance on
a visual tracking task. Then, they enrolled the subjects on a two months physical
exercise programme. After the two months, they re-did the thought suppression and
visual tracking tasks and found that ego depletion was significantly reduced. The
authors also found that relative to the control group, the exercise group reduced their
cigarette, alcohol and junk food consumption. They also studied more and watched
less television. The fact that adherence to an exercise regime produced improvements
in spheres of life unrelated to physical exercise (such as studying) is of fundamental
importance to showing that willpower can grow with exercise over the long run if
willpower is viewed as a single resource required for a majority of everyday decisions.
In another experiment, (2007), Oaten and Cheng found that participation in a
four months financial monitoring programme not only reduced impulsive purchases
and increased the savings rate of the subjects, but also improved their performance
on experimental self-regulation tasks, such as visual tracking. Like in the physical
exercise regime, participants also reported reduced consumption of caffeine, alcohol and
cigarettes, as well as improved eating habits, emotional control and studying efforts.
At the same time, measures of perceived stress, emotional distress and self-efficacy
remained unchanged, pointing once again to an improvement in underlying willpower.
Further evidence on long term effects of repeated exercise of self-control can be found
in Oaten and Cheng (2005) and Gailliot, Plant, Butz and Baumeister (2007).
Putting the short-term and the long-term findings together, we believe the view
of self-control as resembling a muscle is apt. Repeated exercise becomes increasingly
painful in the short run, but a series of such exercises strengthens the self-control
reserves, or muscle, in the long run. A sophisticated individual, who is aware of these
effects, can act strategically with respect to managing the strength of his self-control
reserves.
5 Review of Selected Self-Control Literature
Ever since Shefrin and Thaler (1981, 1988) introduced their planner-doer version of a
dual-self agent, the literature on self-control and addiction has seen several interpreta¬
tions of the dual-self/dual-system initiative. In what is possibly the most well-known
dual-self paper, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) formalize the Shefrin-Thaler ideas and
develop a model in which the decision is viewed as a game between a sequence of short
run myopic selves and a long run rational self. In this two-stage game, first the long
run player chooses the self-control action, which can influence the utility function of
the myopic self; then the short run player makes the final decision. In Fudenberg and
Levine self-control is always possible: at some reduction of utility, the long run self
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can always implicitly control the choices of the short run self. As a result, equilib¬
rium of the game effectively corresponds to a solution of a single-agent optimisation
problem. This model provides an interesting explanation to a number of empirical
findings. In particular, Fudenberg and Levine predict that when the short run self has
access to wealth, the savings rate is reduced to keep self-control costs low; they also
find that the propensity to spend out of unanticipated cash receipts is greater than out
of unanticipated bank account receipts and claim that sufficiently small gambles are
evaluated with the preferences (over consumption) of the short run self, which are more
risk-averse than preferences over long term consumption, therefore explaining Rabin's
(2000) paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. Fudenberg and Levine also make
predictions in stationary stopping time problems, can incorporate the effect of cognitive
load on self-control, and the reduced version of their model is consistent with Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) axioms. However, some of their main results, particularly in
the banking version of the model, depend of the specific timing of when one short-run
self is replaced by the next. Whereas Fudenberg and Levine point out that the "atten¬
tion span" of the short run self would be an interesting subject of investigation, they do
not specify a mechanism which would explain the timing of the succession of the short
run selves. Although they make some appeal to the idea that large stakes invoke the
long run self, it is still unclear why the short runs self cannot simply grab the money
and run out of the bank! Interestingly, because the long run self can effectively ration
the short run self, the deterministic version of the banking model has an equilibrium
equivalent to a model without a self-control problem. Similarly, with no uncertainty,
Fudenberg and Levine cannot predict neither Rabin's paradox nor the procrastination
results of O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001).
Benhabib and Bisin (2005) develop another two-system model based on neuroscien-
tific foundations. They assume that agents have the ability to invoke either automatic
processes (susceptible to temptation) or controlled processes, which induce the agent
to implement a set of goals, determined independently of the specific choice prob¬
lem. The final decision is governed by a supervisory function which can override
the initial response of the automatic process and implement the controlled goal when¬
ever the consequences of the automatic decision become too costly. In the dynamic
consumption-saving setting, agents trade off excessive immediate consumption with a
consumption-saving rule, requiring an exercise of self-contiol. The present bias in
the model derives from stochastic shocks that enter directly into the utility function,
and hence affect the consumption-saving decision. Benhabib and Bisin show that
an environment with larger temptations is characterised by a higher probability that
self-control is exercised, but on the other hand, agents in such environments set less
ambitious goals in the first place.
Similarly, in Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2007), behaviour is an outcome of the
interaction of deliberative processes, which assess choices with a broad goal-based per-
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spective, and affective processes, which incorporate emotions and motivational drives.
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue justify the dual-process approach on the basis of the
broad neurophysiological division of the brain into the prefrontal cortex and the evo¬
lutionary older brain structures. The latter had evolved to promote survival and
reproduction and their functions have changed little over time. The prefrontal cortex,
on the other hand, captures what seems to be a uniquely human ability to deliberate
on the broader consequences of one's actions. It is assumed that the affective system
is initially in control but the deliberative system can take over by exerting some ef¬
fort, or willpower. Unlike most dual-self models, rather than assume that one system
is subordinate to the other, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue allow for complex ways in
which the two systems interact and influence each other. For example, aside from the
actual neural connections between prefrontal cortex and the rest of the brain, there is
also considerable evidence that emotional input from the affective system is required
for sound deliberative thinking - without it the deliberative system struggles to assess
the value of future consequences. They also incorporate Baumeister's intuition that
willpower is depleted with use, so that with repeated attempts at self-control the de¬
liberative system has less influence over behaviour. Additionally, the model has scope
for considering how the effects of various environmental stimuli, stress and cognitive
load affect the relative influence of the two systems. The Loewenstein and O'Donoghue
framework is more general than the majority of the literature and can be applied not
only to intertemporal choice, but also to risk taking behaviour and social preferences.
In intertemporal choice, which is the domain most relevant to our own paper, the
model predicts that people who have particularly strong affective reactions to stimuli
will exhibit more myopic behaviour, explains why impulsive actions are often associated
with strong emotions, and provides a re-interpretation of hyperbolic discounting. This
generality comes at a cost though: the model is not fully specified and does not have
an explicit solution. Many of the model's implications come directly from the psy-
chological/neurophysiological assumptions made and are not a result of mathematical
logic.
In contrast to the above papers, we do not grant the long run self the ability to
always control the choices of the myopic self. The fundamental premise of our paper
is that people can make systematic mistakes (even with perfect forecast) and the pre¬
cise purpose of introducing a second self is to capture such 'mistaken' behaviour. We
borrow this idea from Bernheim and Rangel (2004) who present a model of addiction
in which they argue that firstly, use among addicts is frequently a mistake; secondly,
experience with addictive substance sensitizes individual to addictive cues that trigger
mistaken usage; and thirdly, addicts understand their susceptibility to cue-triggered
mistakes and attempt to manage the process with some degree of sophistication. In
their model, upon exposure to environmental cues, individual can sometimes enter a
'hot mode' in which he always consumes the addictive substance irrespective of under-
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lying pieferences, the rest of the time individual operates in a 'cold mode' in which
he acts like a standard rational agent who takes into account that the 'hot mode' can
sometimes occur. Equilibrium behaviour in the model corresponds to the solution
of dynamic piogramming problem (for the 'cold state' self) with stochastic state de¬
pendent mistakes (the cue-triggered 'hot modes'). The Bernheim and Rangel paper
is complex and intricate and is very specific to addictive behaviour; however, they do
provide a tractable model which augments standard economic theory with biological
foundations of addiction in a non-trivial way. In equilibrium of their model, par¬
ticular patterns of consumption depend systematically on the characteristics of the
individual, the substance and the environment. For example, Bernheim and Rangel
find that when one substance is more addictive than another, then ceteris paribus the
more addictive substance is associated with less consumption among relatively new
users but with more consumption among the highly experienced users. In contrast to
most dual-system models, the authors also make some concrete welfare predictions.
Specifically, they find that a beneficial policy intervention potentially exists only in the
circumstances when users unsuccessfully attempt to abstain and depend on the usage
patterns. For example, they find it optimal to subsidize an addictive substance when
the likelihood of use increases with past experience.
We view the dual-self models in general as an alternative to the hyperbolic dis¬
counting models in investigating the circumstances in which decisions may diverge from
preferences. As discussed in most of the above papers, the existing fMRI evidence from
neuroscience suggests that, although still crude, the dual-system approach is a better
fit for the modular structure of the brain than the successive multiple selves of hyper¬
bolic discounting. A further advantage of dual-self models is that, in contrast to the
multiplicity of infinite time (quasi-) hyperbolic equilibria, these models are usually able
to generate a unique prediction. The multiplicity in the hyperbolic model is analogous
to the folk-theorem like multiplicity in standard repeated games. In fact, as Krusell,
Kuruscu and Smith (2005) point out, this multiplicity is not resolved even by restrict¬
ing attention to Markov perfect equilibria13. In addition, many hyperbolic equilibria
impose a peculiar belief structure on the agent which is often counter-intuitive, see for
example the cyclical beliefs in the procrastination model of O'Donoghue and Rabin
(2001).
Thus, we choose to rely on the dual-self approach which allows us to model sys¬
tematic mistakes and generates a unique solution. Although the focus of our papei
is on the dynamics of willpower and not explicitly on the interaction of various (often
external) forces that determine which self or system is in control of decision making,
13Yet whereas in repeated games there are often intuitive reasons for why different sets of strategies
can constitute an equilibrium and why several equilibria may be simultaneously reasonable, in the case
of one hyperbolic agent, it is not always clear why the different temporal selves cannot renegotiate
themselves out of an unattractive equilibrium.
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there is a parallel: by exercising self-control in the short run, the rational self can reduce
the frequency with which the myopic self makes decisions in the future. However, this
effect is specific to our model and is one of the ways in which we differ fundamentally
from the above literature.
Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman (2006) is the only other paper we are aware of
that explicitly models the dynamics ofwillpower depletion. They examine the canonical
single-agent fixed horizon cake eating problem with the introduction of a willpower
constraint, where the agent has to split his willpower between rationing the cake and
some alternative activity. Based on the same psychological evidence and intuitions
from Baumeister et al as our own paper, the authors assume that the greater restraint
the consumer exercises, the faster his willpower diminishes; and that a given level of
consumption depletes willpower faster when the initial reserves of willpower are lower.
In addition to incorporating all the standard results of the self-control literature, such
as preference reversals and the demand for pre-commitment, this model is also able to
explain upward sloping consumption paths. They argue that an agent may increase
consumption over time because exercising self-control later, when his stock of willpower
is reduced, may require more willpower than exercising the same self-control earlier.
In fact, they show that consumption smoothing is optimal only if there is so much
willpower to start with that allocating any more towards the intertemporal activity
would not increase the utility that can be achieved from it, which is never optimal
provided that redirecting more willpower towards some other activity strictly increases
utility obtained in that other activity. This is an interesting result and one not shared
by other models of self-control, even though the same behaviour could also be explained
by models of anticipatory or reference dependent utility. Another interesting result of
this paper is the claim that differences in self-control choices of the rich and the poor
are a direct reflection of the differences in wealth. In particular, the authors consider
two agents who have the same initial willpower, self-control technology and preferences,
but differ in the size of the initial cake. They find that the rich and the poor agents
will have the same consumption paths in the absolute until the poor agent runs out of
cake, which makes the poor agent appear less disciplined as he is consuming at a higher
rate. We think that our intuition, which relies on differences in underlying well-being
between the rich and the poor, is more plausible.
6 Conclusion
In thinking about the future directions of this reseaich, it might be instructive to
consider the experience of some developing countries, such as Mexico, Thailand, Brazil,
which have only recently acquired the widespread obesity problem. The emergence
of obesity in these countries initially had a greater effect on the higher socioeconomic
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groups. In fact, Sobel and Stunkard (1989) showed that whereas obesity followed an
inverse socioeconomic gradient in the developed world, in the developing countries the
association was strongly positive. Recently, however, these trends began to change,
with obesity shifting down the socioeconomic ladder. For example, national surveys
in Brazil found that while in 1989 obesity in adults was more prevalent in higher
socioeconomic status, 10 years later the higher prevalence was observed among the
lower socioeconomic groups (Monteiro et ah, 2004). In other words, when the new food
technologies were first introduced, they were still inaccessibly expensive to the poor,
particularly compared to the cheap local produce, and obesity remained the prerogative
of the rich. As the food technologies became more ingrained and mass produced food
dropped in relative price, obesity became affordable to the poor, and slimness, in turn,
became the prerogative of the rich. We think that such trends in obesity over time
could be explained by a model of status and social competition, in which self-control has
a signalling value. The existing literature has made some headway in that direction,
with Avner Offer (2001) being the main proponent of marriage competition driving the
changing weight norms across socioeconomic groups. Other works include Graham
and Felton (2005) but a complete model is yet to come.
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Part 2
A Model of Job Autonomy and
Self-Control
Abstract
In this chapter, we develop a model of job autonomy, human capital and self-control which
aims to explain the effect of different types of occupations on self-control outcomes, which is
distinct from the pure income effect of wages. Jobs differ in the degree of autonomy placed
on the worker. We argue that successful performance in autonomous jobs requires the kind of
human capital, acquiring which demands exercise of self-control in the first place. Accumulating
such human capital then has spill-over effects on individual's level of willpower in other areas
of his life. We show that an increase in the degree of job autonomy in fact increases the steady
state levels of willpower, self-control and human capital. Increasing the return to human capital
has a similar effect. We also find an upper bound for marginal cost of self-control for which a
small increase in autonomy increases agents' experienced welfare in steady state.
1 Introduction
It is now an established empirical fact that obesity has risen dramatically in the de¬
veloped world over the last 30 years, with the effects of rising weights becoming in¬
creasingly detrimental to health (WHO, 2004; HSE, 2006; Flegal et al, 2002; Bray et
al, 1998). It is also a well established fact that the burden of obesity falls dispro¬
portionately on the least privileged social groups (Sobal and Stunkard, 1989; Healthy
People 2010 Report; HSE, 2006). In our previous chapter, we argued that, developed in
times of food insecurity, the human genotype may be maladapted to the environment of
food abundance (Ulijaszek, 2007), and therefore advances in food technology that have
made food abundant, readily-accessible and cheap have also made obesity a problem
of self-control. We then developed a dynamic model of willpower which predicts lower
self-control outcomes for the lower income groups and thus goes some way towards
explaining the inverse socioeconomic gradient of obesity.
However, income itself is only one component of socioeconomic status, which also
typically comprises education and occupation. Already in 1989, in their seminal review
of 144 obesity studies, as well as showing that groups of lower socioeconomic status
were at higher risk of obesity, especially for women, Sobal and Stunkaid indicated that
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results could vary according to the measure of socioeconomic status being used. Since
then, studies that consider the components of economic status separately often find the
strongest and most consistent inverse relationship of obesity with education (Wardle
et al, 2002; McLaren, 1997) and occupation (Ball and Crawford, 2005). This suggests
that the income effect alone does not tell the whole story.
In this chapter, we develop a model of job autonomy, human capital and self-
control which aims to explain the effect of different types of occupations on self-control
outcomes, which is distinct from the pure income effect of wages. Jobs differ in the
skills they require; they also differ in the degree of autonomy and self-determination
entrusted to the worker. We argue that jobs may also differ in how the relevant skills
can be acquired. Accumulating human capital requires effort, but the amount and
type of effort may differ across skills. Highly autonomous jobs, which bestow a lot
of independence on the worker, may allow for flexibility, creativity and individualised
approach, but will also require the individual to exercise discipline and self-control. To
become 'productive' at this kind of job, the individual will need to invest in self-control
effort. If in addition, the autonomous job is relatively skilled, acquiring the relevant
skills would also require self-control effort from the individual. Being 'productive' in
a more routine job, which sets stricter guidelines on how the job is to be performed,
is more repetitive, or simply has a high level of monitoring tends to demand less self-
control effort on behalf of the individual. It is easy to imagine that more routine
jobs entail the type of skills which can be more easily picked up "on the job", through
learning by doing or formal training. Accumulating the necessary human capital would
then also require less self-control effort. The idea is that if successful performance on
a job requires self-control or demands the kind of skills, accumulating which requires
exercise of self-control effort in the first place, this effort will have spillover effects,
leading the individual to accumulate more willpower and be more 'in control' in all
areas of his life14.
We model autonomy as reinforcing self-control efforts in skill accumulation and show
that a rise in the degree of job autonomy raises the levels of willpower and self-control
in steady state. In our set-up, a rise in autonomy also raises the amount of human
capital the individual chooses to accumulate, as autonomy provides the incentive for
extra self-control effort which leads to greater skills. Insofar as greater skills command a
higher wage, an increase in job autonomy also raises individual's earnings, and therefore
consumption.
As in Chapter 1, our model is based on the premise that people can make systematic
14 This model can equally be re-interpreted as a model of education. Insofar as education is not
only about what one learns, but also the process through which an individual gains knowledge and
understanding, this process of obtaining education usually demands self-control. People with high
levels of education will have invested a lot of self-control effort into learning, which according to our
theory, should spill-over into greater willpower in other areas of theii life.
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mistakes; reducing the likelihood of such mistakes amounts to self-control in our ap-
proach. Thus we model the individual as comprised of two selves: rational and myopic.
Decisions of the myopic self represent the propensity for systematic mistakes. The ra¬
tional self, on the other hand, is forward looking and sophisticated in the sense that he
understands the process through which the myopic self might come to make decisions,
and acts to maximise lifetime utility, taking the myopic self into account15. Since the
only function of the myopic self is to represent systematic mistakes, we maintain the
standard assumption that individual has a single set of preferences, which allows us to
use the agent's experienced utility as the welfare criterion. We present an upper bound
on the marginal cost of self-control for which an increase in willpower associated with
greater income or autonomy, results in a welfare improvement for the agent.
2 The Autonomous Jobs Model
In this model, we continue to consider an infinitely-lived individual, comprised of two
selves: a rational forward looking self and a myopic alter ego. At any point in time,
where time is infinite and continuous, one of the selves is chosen to act; the rational self
is selected with probability p(X(t)), where X(t) is the individual's stock of willpower.
As in Chapter 1, willpower grows with self-control effort, /(f), and depreciates at rate
5 if left unused. The new feature of this model is that the individual now also works.
Work requires skills, K(t), which reflect the agent's productivity, and pays a wage,
w(K(t)). Skills, or human capital, accumulate as a function of self-control effort,
g(I(t),9), where g(-) is concave in self-control /(f), and 9 is a parameter which captures
the degree of worker's independence, flexibility or autonomy. We model autonomy as
reinforcing the self-control effort in skills accumulation and so assume that gjg(I(t), 9) >
0. Human capital depreciates over time at rate 5 (knowledge and skills are forgotten
with time if not used). For simplicity, we assume the same depreciation rate for human
capital and willpower. Finally, the individual derives utility u(-) from consumption;
the rational self chooses his level of consumption, c(t); the myopic self consumes the
same constant amount, m.
Then, if chosen, the rational self decides how much self-control activity, /(f), to
perform, and how much to consume c(f). The choice of self-control effort now has
two effects. Firstly, the exercise of self-control allows the individual to accumulate
skills K(t), which lead to a wage w(K(t)), which in turn allows for the individual's
consumption. Secondly, the exercise of self-control increases the stock of willpower,
15We borrow the "systematic mistake" interpretation of the myopic self from Bernheim and Rangel,
2004.
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X(t), which increases the probability that the rational self is chosen to act in the first
place.
Individual s consumption must satisfy the lifetime budget constraint, so that the
discounted sum of lifetime expected consumption between the two selves should equal
the discounted sum of lifetime earnings16:
00 OO
J \p(X{t))c{t) + {l-p{X{t)))m}e-rtdt = j w{K(t))e~rtdt (2.1)
0 0
Since savings have no intrinsic value in this model, in the absence of a myopic self,
in equilibrium or steady state of this model, the rational self would simply consume
his wage. The myopic self represents mistakes in consumption; we assume he 'over-
consumes', so that m > cs, and in fact, m > w{Ks). Thus, if the myopic self is
in control, he consumes more than the individual's earnings. The rational self then
adjusts his consumption plan below w(Ks) to account for the 'overconsumption' of the
myopic self. In some sense, the rational self 'saves' to compensate for the myopic
self. The assumption that m is constant is somewhat stylised; it is as if there exists
a bundle of temptation goods that the myopic self consumes regardless of his wage.
This means that an individual with a lower wage will 'overconsume' a relatively greater
amount than someone with a higher wage and consequently will have to compensate
by adjusting the rational self's consumption even further downwards. Since this kind
of structure is imposed on the decision maker, we do not view 'overconsumption' on
its own as a measure of self-control in this model. The degree of willpower and self-
control is measured only by the variables X and I. To this extent, it is important that
our structure does not bias a relatively poor individual towards lower self-control; if
anything, the bias is in the opposite direction. Consider a relatively poor individual
with w(Kl) '■ every time the myopic self takes control and consumes to, the rational
self has to compensate with a low cl■ With a concave utility function, this is costly
for the individual as the utility he loses with every unit of foregone consumption when
moving to cl, which lies on the steep part of his utility function is greater than the
utility he gains for every unit of extra consumption at m, which is on the shallower
part of utility. A relatively rich individual, with w(Kh), would not have to travel as
far down his utility function to compensate for the myopic self, so his marginal cost
of overconsumption is lower. Thus, the relatively poor individual should have more
incentive to reduce the probability of the myopic self taking control, and the only way
to do that is to accumulate more willpower17.
1(1We write budget constraint as satisfied with equality since in the steady state of this model, the
agent has no incentive to save, and should consume all his earnings as long as satiation point is not
reached.
17Of course, letting consumption of the myopic self increase with earnings, m(w(k)), would be a more
realistic representation. However, we find that in that case, the main results remain qualitatively very
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The two selves share the same utility function, which implies that u (c5) < it (m)
since c < m. This is in contrast to our baseline model, described in Chapter 1, where
we assumed that, in steady state, the utility of the self-control state was greater than
of temptation state, u(Xs,y) — e(Is) > u(m). The logic was that, otherwise, the
rational self could run his willpower reserves down to zero and mimic the myopic self.
In this model, the logic is different. The myopic self achieves greater utility than the
rational self, but only the rational self puts the effort in to gain skills that earn him
wages. Thus, if the rational self were to mimic the myopic self and run willpower
reserves down to zero, his human capital would also depreciate to zero, and he would
no longer be earning wages. His consumption would then also have to go to zero. For
any 'reasonable' cost of self-control, this cannot be optimal18.
We make the following assumptions on the structure of payoff and cost functions:
Assumption 1
du(c)1. The payoff function u(c) is concave in c , and limc^o = oo and
oc
du(c)lim^oo —-— = 0. Similarly, for u(m).
2. The probability function p(X) is concave in X, with p(0) = 0 and lim^^oo p(X) =
1.
3. The cost function e(/) is convex in /, bounded and e'(I) is bounded above.
4. The skills accumulation function g(-) is concave in I, and bounded above; g(0) =
0, gjg(I,e)> 0, ge(I,9) = e> 0.
Moreover, u(c), p(X), e(I) and g(I,9) are all C^2\
In parallel to Assumption 1 of Chapter 1, we assume that utility is concave in
consumption and probability is concave in willpower, and that the Inada conditions are
satisfied, which allows us to get rid of the multipliers associated with a potential zero
solution, which is not economically interesting. The convexity assumption on the cost
of self-control is once again driven by the well-documented psychological evidence that
repeated exercise of self-control becomes progressively more difficult in the short run
(Baumeister and Vohs, 2007). In addition, we also assume that the skills accumulation
function is concave in the self-control effort and that self-control and autonomy act as
complements; for now we also assume that autonomy on its own has a positive effect on
human capital, but this effect is negligible. This represents the situation in which an
increase in autonomy, or the degree of self-determination or flexibility, has a positive
similar to the simpler set up (with some additional conditions, naturally) but the increase in algebiaic
complication is considerable. Thus, we stick to the simpler version with m — const.
18Given a constant m, the budget constraint would also no longer be satisfied.
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effect on workers skills; we maintain that this effect is small so as not to bias our
results.
The sophisticated rational self, who discounts the future at rate r, maximises the
discounted lifetime utility subject to the equation of motion for willpower, the accumu¬
lation of human capital equation and the budget constraint, taking into account that,
with probability (1 — p(X(t))), the myopic self will be making decisions in the future:
OO
maxJ \p(X{t)){u(c(t)) - e(/(t))) + (1 - p{X(t)))u{m)} e~rtdt (2.2)
o
s.t. X = p(X(t))I(t) - SX(t), VX e [0, oo), X(0) = X0
K = p(X(t))g(I(t),0)-6K(t), VK e [0,oo), K(0) = K0
OO OO
J \p(X(t))c(t) + (1 - p(X(t)))m\ e~rtdt = J w{K(t))e~rtdt
o o
The objective functional in (2.2) is the average of the net utilities of the rational and
the myopic selves, weighted by the probabilities of the rational and the myopic selves
making the decision. The equations of motion for willpower and human capital reflect
the idea that only the rational self exercises self-control and therefore accumulates skills
and willpower, but the depreciation of both occurs regardless of which self is in control.
The explicit introduction of the budget constraint makes this an isoperimetric problem.
To solve this problem, we introduce a new variable
t
Q — — J \p(X(t))(c(t) - m) + m - w(K(t))]e~rtdt (2.3)
o
where the expression under the integral is just a rearrangement of last constraint in
(2.2) with all terms on the left hand side. Then Q = - \p(X(t))(c(t) - m) + m - w(K(t))] e~rt,
with <3(0) =0 and <3(oo) = 0, which follows directly from substituting the integration
limits into (2.3).
We strive to retain the generality of this model, but for the sake of tractability, we
make one further simplifying assumption. We assume that wage is directly proportional
to the amount of human capital.
Assumption 2 Wage is linear in human capital, w(K) = wK.
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In simplified form, the rational self's problem can be written as19:
oo
V{X,K) = maxJ \p{X){u{c) - e{I) - u(m)) + u(m)]e-rtdt (2.4)
o
s.t. X =p{X)I-6X, X{0) = X0
K = p(X)g(1,6) - SK, K(0) = K0
Q = ~ \p{X)(c ~m) +m- wK] e~r\ Q{0) = 0, Q{oo) - 0
Proposition 2.1 The solution of the rational self's optimisation problem (2.f) ap¬
proaches a steady state. This steady state is an asymptotically unstable saddle point,
with two positive and two negative eigenvalues, if 6 — Isp'(Xs) > 0.
The proof is straightforward but algebraically involved and can be found in the
Appendix to this chapter. As in the baseline model, we assume that the X = 0
isocline is upward sloping in the (X, I) plane, and therefore <5 - Isp'(Xs) > 0, so that
higher willpower steady states require higher self-control to sustain them. Recall that
if p{X) is rising sufficiently quickly to compensate for the fall in I, it is possible to have
the opposite sign, which in this case would also give a unique path that converges to
steady state. However, we continue to think that the positive slope is the more natural
interpretation, more so even than uniqueness, and hence proceed with Assumption 3.
Assumption 3 S — Isp'(Xs) > 0
Corollary 2.1 The steady state consumption plan of the rational self is c* = m —
mp[x^) • ^ ™ increasing in steady state levels of human capital and willpower, and
decreasing in the consumption of the myopic self. The path of consumption is constant,
i.e. the agent 'jumps' to c* at t = 0, and uses the self-control variable to adjust to the
steady state.
Proof. Write down the current value Hamiltonian and the necessary conditions:
H(X,K,I,C,a,P, 7) = p(X)(u{c)-e(I)-u{m)) + u{m) + a(p{X)I-5X)if2.5)
f3(p(X)g(I) - 5K) - 7{p(X)(c -m) +m- w{K))
1!'As before, we drop the time subscripts since this is an infinite time problem in which time does
not enter as an independent variable.
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6H
™ =p{X)(u'(c) -7) = 0 (2.6)
W=P(X)(a-e'(I)+Pgi(I,0))= 0 (2.7)
d = (r + S - ip'(X))a - p'(X){u(c) - u(m) - e(i) - /fy(J, 0) + (c - m)7) (2.8)
/3 = (r + £)/3 - 7w (2.9)
7 = -ff = ° (2.10)
hm e~rtH{X,K, I,C,Q,a, /3,7) = 0 (2.11)
From condition (2.6), it is obvious that 7 = u'{c). Differentiating both sides with
respect to time, we get
7 = u"(c)c (2.12)
However, from condition (2.10), we can see that 7 = 0, since the Hamiltonian is
not a function of Q, implying that c = 0, since u"{c) < 0 Vc. Thus, consumption
follows a constant path. That the multiplier on the integral constraint is constant
over time is a standard feature of isoperimetric problems. Notice also, that although
H(X,K,I,C,a,P,'y) is a current value Hamiltonian, 7 is not a current, but rather
the present value multiplier since the constraint Q = - \p(X)(c - m) + m - wK\ e~rt
already contains the discount term.
Next, recall that in steady state, all time paths must be constant, including Q.
Solving this expression for c gives c* — m - It is straightforward to see that
dc* w n dc* m—wKs ^ n _
dK3 ■> U, qxS - p(xs)2 > U. ■
The fact that consumption turns out to be constant is not all that surprising con¬
sidering that it does not enter into either of the state equations. Since consumption
is not one of the levers through which an individual can adjust his levels of willpower
or human capital, there is no reason why the agent would find it optimal to consume
at any level other than the steady state level while adjusting to steady state. The
consumption of the rational self is increasing in willpower since more willpower means
that the individual makes myopic mistakes less frequently, i.e. the opportunity for the
myopic self to 'overconsume' is reduced, therefore reducing the need for the rational self
to compensate by adjusting his consumption downwards. Hence, with higher levels
of willpower, the rational self can enjoy higher levels of consumption whilst he is in
control, which also achieves a greater degree of consumption smoothing.
2.1 Comparative Analysis
In this section we examine the effects that changes in autonomy and wages have on the
steady state.
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Proposition 2.2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, an increase in job autonomy 0 in¬
creases steady state willpower, Xs, self-control, 1^, and human capital, Ks.
Proof. Step 1. The steady state occurs when the following system of equations holds
simultaneously:
p(Xs)Is - = 0 (2.13)
p(Xs)g(Is,9) - 5KS = 0 (2.14)
(r + 5)(3 - wu'(c*) — 0 (2.15)
p'(Xs)(u(c*)-u(m)-e(Is) + /3sg(Is,9) + (m-c*)u'(c*))-
(r + 6-Isp\Xs))(e'(Is) + t3sgi(Is,6)) ~ [ '
Step 2. Find the Jacobian of the steady state system and ascertain the sign of its
determinant.
Js(X = 0, k = 0,p = 0,i = 0)= (2.17)
-6 + Isp'(Xs) 0 0 p(Xs)
p'(xs)g(is,e) 0 p{xs)9l{is,e)
0 0 r + 5 0
p'Kl{3~<£} -(r+«-w»-e(I ) + I e(I ) s , s t "(TS\
o a q a u (r + o — 1 p (X x (e (1 )
+{m — c Ju (c ))
The determinant of the steady state Jacobian J5:
Det[Js] = -<5(r+<5)
/ -p(Xs)p"(Xs)(u(c*) - u(m) + (m - c*)u'(c*) - e(/s) + Ise'(Is)+
ps(g(is,e)-is9l(is,e))
\ +(J - Isp'{Xs))(r + S - Isp'(Xs))(e"(Is) - (3sgi1 (Is, 6))
(2.18)
Consider the sign of (u(c*) - u(m) + (m - c*)u'(c*) - e(Is) + Ise'(Is) + (3s(g(Is, 9) —
Isgi(Is,9)). By concavity of u(-), and because c* < m, we can say that (m-c*)u'(c*) >
u(m) - u(c*) and so u(c*) - u(m) + (m - c*)u'(c*) > 0. Similarly, by concavity of g(-),
g(Is, 9) - Isgi(Is, 9) > 0 and by convexity of e(-), e(Is) - Ise'(Is) < 0. Putting
these together, we can see that (■u(c*) — u(m) + (m — c*)u'(c*) — e(Is) + Ise'(Is) +
f3s(g(Is,9) - Isgi(Is,9)) > 0. The expression (e"(Is) - (3sgn(Is,9)) > 0 follows
immediately from convexity of e(-) and concavity of g(•). Then, undei the assumption
of S — Isp'(Xs) > 0, we can conclude that Det[Js\ < 0.
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Step 3. To find the effect of a change in autonomy on the steady state, totally








































PS(p(Xs)ge(Is, 6) + (r + 5- Isp'(Xs))gie(Is, 6))
Applying Cramer's rule, we have








_ (r+S)p(Xs) (0 91,
ae ~ Det[Js] (z.zi)
-ps(g(Is, 6)p'{Xs) + {5- Isp'(Xs))9l(Is, 0)) \
(p'(Xs)ge(Is, 9) + (r + 5 — Isp'(Xs))gie(Is, 6))
( —p(Xs)p"(Xs)(u(c*) — u(m) — e(Is) + Ise'(Is) N
+/3s(g(Is, 6) - IS9I(IS, 9)) + (m - c*)u'{c*))
V +(6-Isp'(Xs))(r + 6-Isp'(Xs))(e"(Is)-f3sgn(Is,6)) / )
We have previously assumed that autonomy and self-control reinforce each other,
so gj0(Is,9) > 0, and that autonomy on its own has a small positive effect on skills
accumulation gg(Is,9) > 0. With these assumptions, it is clear that the numerators
in each of the equations (2.19)-(2.21) are negative. With the denominator also being
negative, Det[Js] < 0, we can see that the effect of a rise in autonomy on the steady
state variables Xs, Is, Ks is positive. ■
Proposition 2.2 states the main result of this version of our model, namely that
steady state levels of willpower, self-control and human capital all increase with a rise
in autonomy. Recall also that steady state consumption of the rational self is increasing
in willpower and human capital, so a rise in autonomy will also increase the steady state
consumption. Aside from the upward sloping X = 0 isocline and the technicalities
of the rest of the Assumption 1, the driving force behind this result is the idea that
autonomy and self-control reinforce each other in a way that has a beneficial effect on
the agent's productivity or human capital. An increase in autonomy then provides an
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additional incentive for the agent to put in extra self-control effort as this will result
in higher human capital, and therefore higher earnings and higher consumption for the
rational self. Additionally, the process of putting in extra self-control effort into skill
accumulation spills over into increasing the agent's willpower reserves, which in turn
reduces the frequency ofmyopic mistakes in consumption and has an additional positive
effect on the consumption of the rational self. Thus, if obesity is inversely related
to self-control, a positive relationship between autonomy and self-control, in which a
rise in autonomy can increase the marginal product of self-control effort in acquiring
skills, can potentially explain the inverse relationship between occupational status and
obesity found in the empirical work.
We have so far been assuming that gg{Is,9) — e > 0, i.e. the effect of autonomy
on productivity is small but positive. Technically, this is not necessary for our results,
as the assumption of gie(Is,0) > 0 is sufficient. Recall that we assumed a positive
g$(Is, 9) to represent the situation where an increase in flexibility or self-determination
has a positive effect on workers' skills. However, it is possible to imagine a situation
in which an increase in job autonomy on its own, unaccompanied by an increase in
self-control, in fact has a detrimental effect on skills accumulation. For example, if the
workers already tend to shirk when unsupervised, an increase in autonomy represented
in removal of some supervision could result in workers accumulating fewer skills, and
thus becoming less productive. Corollary 2.2 below states that in this case an increase
in autonomy can still have a positive effect on steady state levels of willpower, self-
control and human capital if the negative first order effect of autonomy is 'not too
large'.
Corollary 2.2 If ge(Is, 9) < 0. the results of Proposition 2.2 hold if
Corollary follows directly from proof of Proposition 2.2.
So far, we have shown how an increase in the degree of job autonomy or self-
determination can move the individual to a steady state with higher levels of willpower,
self-control and human capital. Part of this effects comes from the positive effect that
an increase in autonomy has on earnings, through increase in steady state levels of
human capital. Thus, it would not be surprising if an increase in the marginal return
to human capital also lead to a higher steady state. We show this below.
Proposition 2.3 Under Assumptions 1 — 3, a rise in the marginal return to human
capital, w, increases steady state willpower, , self-control, 1^, and human capital,
Ks.
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Proof. Using the same methods as in Proposition 2.2, we arrive at the following results:
Ml = Sp(Xs)u'(c')(p'(Xs)c,(Is.,e)+(r+6-Isp'(Xs))ai(Is,B)) ,0 o0,
dw Det[Js] \l-ll)




_ -5(S-Isp'(Xs))u'(c*)(p'(Xs)g(Is,e)+(r+6-Isp'(Xs))gj(Is,e)) (r> 0/l\
dw Det[Js} [Z.Z4)
Since 5 — Isp'(Xs) > 0 by assumption, Det[Js] < 0 as shown in proof of Proposition
2.2, and since all first derivatives in the model are positive, we can see that each of
Ml M Ml arP nnsitive ■
dw ' dw ' dw are P0Sltlve- ■
Proposition 2.3 states that an increase in the marginal return to human capital,
increases the steady state levels of willpower, skills and self-control. This result is
in parallel to the main result of our first chapter, namely that self-control is increas¬
ing with income. However, the mechanism is different here. In our first chapter,
higher income led to higher self-control by virtue of reducing the relative payoffs to
temptations compared to the underlying wellbeing among the well-off. In this model,
an increase in marginal return to human capital incentivises the agent to put in more
self-control effort to accumulate skills, as skills now yield a higher return. This trans¬
lates into higher earnings, both through higher w and Ks, which in turn translate into
higher consumption. Through the process of investing self-control effort into skill ac¬
cumulation, the individual now also accumulates more willpower, which increases the
probability of the rational self being in control. Interestingly, the sign of the wage effect
is always positive, and does not depend on the cost of self-control. This effect is similar
to the efficiency view of wages, in which an increase in the wage rate makes the agent
put in more effort, with the addition that in our model this extra effort has beneficial
spillover effects on individual's willpower, and further increases consumption.
An alternative view of wages, such as a theory of compensating wage differentials,
would suggest that if workers have a preference for autonomy, firms with more routine
jobs may have to compensate workers by offering higher wages. In this case we could
observe a negative relationship between autonomy and wages in jobs requiring similar
levels of human capital. If this is so, does an increase in autonomy still lead to a rise
in the steady state? We find that it does as long as the rate of decline of the wage
rate with autonomy is smaller than some upper bound, which depends on the total and
marginal product of self-control effort and how quickly they rise with autonomy.
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Proposition 2.4 If w is a function of 9, and w'(9) < 0, an increase in autonomy 6
increases the steady state levels of willpower, X, self-control, I, and human capital, K,
if
w'{6) ^ p'(Xs)ge(lS,e)+(r+5-Isp'(Xs))qrf)(Is,0) (0
w(6) ^ p>(XX)g(ls,e)+(r+6-lSp'(XS))gi(lS}0)
Proof. Totally differentiate the steady state equations with respect to 9 and solve the
resulting system by Cramer's rule to obtain the following results:
= -MXs) ( u'(c*)w'(9)(p'(Xs)g(Is, 9) + (r + 6 - Isp'(Xs))9l(Is, 9)) \d<1 Det[Js] \ +(r + S)PS(p'(Xs)ge(Is, 9) + (r + 5 - Isp'(Xs))gje(Is, 9)) J
(2.26)
9JS





de - Det[Js] (Z.Z5J
u'(c*)w'(9)(p'(Xs)g(Is, 9) + {5- Isp'(Xs))9l(Is, 9))
(p'(Xs)g(Is, 9) + (r + 6 - Isp\Xs))9l(Is, 6))
+(r + 5)
( -PS(9(IS, 0)P'(XS) + (6- Isp'(Xs))9l(Is, 9))
(p\Xs)ge(Is, 9) + (r + 6 — Isp'(Xs))gie(Is, 9))
(Ts 9] f V(^S)(«(c*) - «(m) - e(Is) 0) + (m - c>'(c*))
V V + (* - lSP'(xS))(r + 6 - ISp'(Xs))(e"(Is) - /3sgu(Is, 9))
Consider the expressions for and ^ first. With Det[Js\ < 0, the term in
brackets has to be positive in order for the expressions (2.26) and (2.27) to be positive.
This is true when
-u'(c*)w'(6)(p'(Xs)g(Is, 9) + (r + 6 — Isp'(Xs))9l(Is, 9))
< (r + 6)Ps(p'(Xs)go(Is, 9) + (r + 6- Isp'(Xs))gie(IS, 9))
Using the fact that /3s = and rearranging, we get:
w'(9) p' (Xs)ge(Is ,e)+(r+6-Isp'(Xs))gig(Is ,9) oq'i
-~Me) < p'{xs)g{is,e)+(r+5-isp'{xs))gi{is,e)
Condition (2.29) is also a sufficient condition for^ > 0, although it is stronger
than strictly required. ■
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2.2 Welfare
We have now established that a rise in autonomy moves the individual to a higher
steady state, with greater levels of willpower, self-control and human capital. Higher
human capital translates directly into higher earnings and higher consumption for the
rational self, whereas higher willpower allows the rational self to enjoy his consumption
more frequently. On the other hand, maintaining this steady state requires higher self-
control, and self-control is costly. Hence, the next question is whether the individual
is always better off in a higher steady state.
Since in our model the myopic self only exists to represent systematic mistakes in
behaviour, we maintain the standard assumption that the individual has a single set of
preferences. We measure individual's wellbeing by his experienced utility:
POO
V(X, I, K, w, 9) — / (ppO(u(c) -e(/)) + (1 - p{X))u{m)) e~rtdt (2.30)Jo
The steady state welfare is then:
V(XS, Is, Ks, w, 9) = p{Xs)(u(c*) - e(Is) - u(m)) + u(m) (2.31)
Proposition 2.5 An increase in autonomy, 9, makes the individual better off if:
UtS\ ^ p'(Xs)(mu'(c*)+p{Xs)(u(c*)-e(Is)-u{m))) . wg:{Is,8)u'(c*) /0 oo\
e\1)< S(p(XS)-X*p'(XO) + <5
Proof. Differentiate the agent's steady state utility with respect to autonomy, 9 :
ov{xs,w.o) = y(xs)s^(u(c*) _ <jS) _ u(m)) + p{Xs)(u'
(2.33)
Using the fact that ^ > 0 (from Proposition 2.2), re-arrange expression (2.33) to
find that mx'jW.v.fi) > o if
S < p'(Xs)mi-{u{c*)-e{Is)-u{m))+p(Xs)u'(c*)% ^ ^
vixS)^W
From proof of Proposition 2.2, expressions (2.19)-(2.20), we can see that
p(^s) - _
-dpr - (5-/V(^s)) ~ 6(p(XS)-X*p'(X»))
oe
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where the last simplification uses the fact that in steady state, Is = (from
(2.13)). Notice that since (<5 — Isp'(Xs)) > 0 by assumption, it must be that (p(Xs) —
Xsp'{Xs)) > 0.
To find -qq , we first use the steady state equations to write c* as a function of X,
and then find Thus, using expression (2.14), we can write:
=* = "•- WS0f <2"35>
wg
m H s p(xs)
and
dc*_ _ mp'(Xs)+w(p(,Xs)-Xsp'(Xs))gr(Is,e) ,0
dX (p(Xs))2 (2.3bJ
Then we can write ^
Substituting back into expression 2.34, we have:
p'(TS\ <T p'(xs)(mu'(c*)+p(xs)(u(c*)-e(ls)-u(m))) wgjjl3,6)u'(c*) <y7\^ ' 6(p(Xs)-Xsp'(Xs)) + 5 (*■<><)
In Proposition 2.5, we show that a small increase in autonomy, and therefore steady
state levels of willpower, human capital and self-control, make the individual better off,
i.e. increase his experienced utility, provided the marginal cost of self-control at steady
state is below an upper bound, defined in (2.37). Increasing the return to human
capital, w, or the marginal product of self-control effort, #/(•), would unambiguously
relax this upper bound.
We have established that steady state levels of willpower and self-control rise with
income. We have also argued that the ultimate cause of obesity lies with the lack
of ability to resist palatable energy-dense foods in the environment of increasing food
availability and its falling relative price. Thus, we believe that optimal weight is
inversely related to willpower. We can write the weight function for individual i as
Wi = Wi + f{X-,uj) (2.38)
where Wi is the individual's optimal weight as determined by his physiological char¬
acteristics, f(X-uj) represents the deviation from optimal weight as a function of the
amount of willpower, and w is a vector of exogenous parameters, such as food abun¬
dance and price, which can shift the / function. We assume that f'(X; u) < 0,
/(0;w) = w™x and limx^oo f{X;u) = wfm < 0, where w™ax represents the maxi¬
mum excess weight individual i would achieve in the absence of willpower, and w™m
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is the largest reduction in weight he can survive at if willpower spirals out into the
'control freak' state.
3 Conclusion
In this extension to our baseline income and self-control model, we develop a model
in which the degree of job autonomy provides an alternative, and often empirically
stronger mechanism through which low socioeconomic status can result in lower self-
control and, therefore higher obesity rates. We believe that successful performance at
a highly autonomous job requires the kind of human capital, acquiring which demands
self-control effort in the first place. Accumulating such human capital would then have
spill-over effects on individual's level of willpower. Indeed, we find that an increase in
the degree of job autonomy can provide the incentive for an individual to accumulate
more human capital, which results not only in higher earnings, but also in greater
willpower and self-control.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Step 1: Recall the Hamiltonian and the necessary conditions:
H(X, K, I, C, a, /3,7) = p{X)(u{c)-e(I)-u(m))+u{m) + a(p(X)I-8X)(f.1.1)
/3{p{X)g(I) - SK) - 7 (p(X)(c -m) +m- wK)
f§=p{X){u'{c)-1) = 0 (4.2)
^=p(X)(a-e'(I) + l3gi(I,9)) = 0 (4.3)
a = + ip'(X))a - p'(X)(u(c) - u(m) - e(i) - /3g(I, 6) + {c- 771)7) (4.4)
j3 = {r + 6)l3-777; (4.5)
7 = ~ff =0 ^
lim e~rtH(X, K,I,C,a,/3,^) = 0 (4.7)
t—>00
Define a vector of model parameters and initial conditions (f — (p, Kq,Xo) =
(<5 v m w K0,Xo). Assume there exists a solution to the necessary conditions (A (t,<f>),K (t,<f>),/3
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and the corresponding costate variables (a(t, (p), /3(t, <p), *y(t, <p), with the propertj' that
(X (t,(j>),K {t,cp),(3 (t, (p), I*(t, cp)) —> [Xs(p), Ks(p), /3s(p), Is(p)) as t —> oo, where
(X {p)i K^{p)i P (p)i I^{p)) is the steady state solution of the necessary conditions.
Let s show that the necessary transversality condition (4.7) is satisfied. Firstly, 7 is a
constant so that lim^007(t) = 7. Second, from condition (4.3), we can see that a —
Because we have assumed that (X*(t,<p), K* (t,(p), f3* (t, <p), I* (t, cp)) -»
(Xs (p), Ks(p), /3s(p), Is(p)) and since e'(I) and gi(I, 6) are bounded, we can say that
a{t,(j>) -> as(p) as t —> 00, where as(p) is the steady state solution for the costate vari¬
able. With this in mind, we can confirm that the necessary transversality condition is
satisfied by the solution (X*(t, (p), K*(t, <p), (3*(t, cf>), I*(t, (p)).
lim e'rtH{X*,K*,r,C*,a*,p*,Y) =t—>00
lim e~rt ( ~~ e(IS) ~~ u(m)) + u{m) + as(p(Xs)Is - 5XS) \
V +PS(p(Xs)g(Is)-6Ks)-1(p(Xs)(cs — m) + m — wKs) J
lim e~rt x const. = 0
t—*OO
Next, let's show that the Mangasarain sufficient conditions are satisfied, so that the
solution to the necessary conditions is in fact the solution to the rational self's problem.
The sufficient conditions are that the Hamiltonian, H(X, K, I,C, a, (3,7), is concave
along the (X*(t, cp), K*(t, <f>), /3*(t, <p), I*(t, cp)) path, and that lim^oo e~rt[a(t, cp)(X*(t, cp) —
X(t)) + /3(t, cp)(K*(t, <p)-K(t)] < 0. Since we have assumed that as t —> 00, X*(t, (p) —>
Xs(p), K*(t,cp) —> Ks(p), a(t, <p) —► as(p), (3(t,cp) —> /3s(p) and because all ad¬
missible paths of X(t) and K(t) are bounded, lim^oo e"rt[a(t, <p)(X*(t, cp) - X(t)) +
/3(t,cp)(K*(t,cp) — K(t)\ = 0. To check for concavity of the Hamiltonian, we need to
show that the Hessian matrix of the Hamiltonian has non-positive eigenvalues. From
(4.2) and (4.3), we know that 7(t) = u'(c(t)) and a(t) = e'(I(t)) - /3(t)gi(I(t),9)
Vt e [0, 00), so the eigenvalues of the Hessian can be written as:
v1 = p(X)u"(c*) (4-8)
z/2 = u\c*)w"{K) = 0
= -p"(Xs) [u(m) - u(c*) + (c* - m)u'{c*) + e(/) - Ie'(I) - 0(g(I, 9) - I9l(I, 9))]
j/4 = p(X) [(3gn{I,9) - e"{I)}
It is clear that v\ = p(X)u"(c) < 0 and ^4 = p(X) [/3sgjj(Is, 9) — e (/)] < 0.
Concavity of n(-) and g{I,9), and convexity of e(/), imply that the second term in vz
is negative (we will show this in detail in Step 3 below), therefore, all eigenvalues of
the Hessian are non-positive. Since we assumed a linear wage rate for human capital,
and so w"(K) = 0, one eigen value V2 = 0. This implies that the Hamiltonian is not
56
strictly concave and the solution may not be unique.
Step 2. Solve the necessary conditions to find a system of differential equations
in (X, K, (3,1). Notice that since consumption is constant, we use one of the costate
variables to complete the system.
/ =
-e"(I)+pgn(IM)
X = p(X)I - sx
K =p(X)g(1,9)-6K
ft = (r + 5)P — wu'(c)
p'(X)(u(c) - u(m) - e(I) + fig(1,9) + (m - c)u'(c))-
{r + 6- Ip'(X))e'(I) + (wu'(c) - PIP'(X))9I(1,9)
The steady state occurs when the above system and





p{Xs)Is - SXs = 0
p(Xs)g(Is,9)-5Ks = 0
(r + 6)P — wu'(c*) = 0
p'{Xs){u(c*) - u(m) - e(Is) + PSg{Is., 9) + {m - c*)u'{c*))-






Step 3. Find the Jacobian of the system (4.9)-(4.12) and evaluate at steady state.
Then find the eigen values. Due to the size of the Jacobian, it is not practical to
present it explicitly in matrix form, but the relevant derivatives are listed below.
J =
"dX ax ax ax-











































u{m) - u{c*) + e(Is) - PSg(IS, 9)+






+p'(xs) [(u(m) - u(c*) + e(Is) + (c* - m)u'(c*))gn(Is, 9) - g(Is, 9)e"(Is)}
dl
dl -e"(is)+P*gn(is,8)x
[-(r + 6)e"(Is) + wu'(c*)9lI(Is, 9) + Isp'(Xs)(e"(Is) - p9lI(Is, 9))}
The eigen values, A, of this jacobian are as follows:
Ai - -(5
X2 = r + 6
(4.19)
(4.20)




(re"(Is) + (/38 - wu'(c*))gn(Is, 9))2 + 4(e"(Is) - f3gn(Is, 9))
(8 - Isp'(Xs)) ((r + <5 - Isp'(Xs))e"(Is) + (psIsp'(Xs) - wu'(c*))9lI(Is, 9))
+n(xsW(xs\ ( ~ u^ + (c* ~ m)u'(c*) \K )P{ }{ +e(IS) - Ise!(Is) - (3s(g(Is, 9) - Is9l(Is, 9)) I
A4 — 2{e"{lS)-^gn{lSte))
re"(Is) + (/3s8 - wu'(c*))gjj(Is, 9)—
(4.22)
V
(re"(Is) + ((38 - wu'(c*))gn(IS, 0))2 + 4(e"(Is) - (3gn(Is, 0))
(6 - Isp'(Xs)) ((r + 8 — Isp'(Xs))e"(Is) + (f3sIsp'(Xs) - wu'(c*))9u(Is, 9))
, f YSN /// wSN f U(m) ~ U(C') + ^ - ™X(C*)P( )P ( } I +e(IS) - 'M/s) - /3S(5(/S, " IS9i(IS, 0)) J
To determine the nature of the steady state, we need to ascertain the sign of the
eigen values (4.19)-(4.22). Obviously, Xj = -S < 0 and A2 = r + 5. We claim that
A3 > 0. Firstly, e"(Is) - f3sgji(Is, 9) > 0, since e(I), is convex in /, g(I, 9) is concave
in I, and (3s > 0 if skills are to have value in steady state. Next, re"(Is) + ((3s8 -
wu'(c*))giI(Is,9) > 0 because (/3s8 - wu'(c*)) = wu'(c*)(^ - 1) < 0, where we use
the fact that (3s = , by equation (4.15). The square root is always positive,
making the whole expression for A3 positive. Then, A4 can only be positive if
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(6 - Isp'(Xs)) [{r + 6- Isp'(Xs))e"(Is) + (/3sIsp'(Xs) - wu'(c*))giI(Is, 0)]




As in the baseline model, we assume that the X = 0 isocline is upward sloping in
the (X, I) plane, which again implies that S — Isp'(Xs) > 0. Then it must be that
r + 5 — Isp'(Xs) > 0 and f3Isp'(Xs) — wu'(c*) < 0. This in turn means that the
first term in expression (4.23) is positive. In the second term, u(m) — u(c*) + (c* —
m)u'{c*) < 0 by concavity of u(-); e(Is) — Ise'{Is) < 0 by convexity of e(I)\ and
—/5"S(<?(T5', 6) - Isgj(Is, 9)) < 0 by concavity of g(-) in /, and since the costate variable
(3s > 0. Coupled with the fact that p"(Xs) < 0 by concavity of p(X), this means that
the second term in expression (4.23) is also positive. Therefore, under the assumption
°f ^ ~ ISp'(Xs) > 0, condition (4.23) cannot hold. Thus, there are two positive and
two negative eigenvalues.
If instead we assume that the X — 0 isocline is downward sloping in the (X, I)
plane, 6 — Isp'(Xs) < 0, it is possible to have a positive A4 if
| (<5 - Isp'(Xs)) [(r + 6- Isp'(Xs))e"(Is) + (/3sIsp'(Xs) - wu'(c*))gn(Is, 0)] | >
(4.24)
u(m) - u(c*) + (c* - m)u'(c*) + e(Is) - Ise'(Is)—
/3s(g(Is,6)-Isgi(Is,9))p(Xs)p"(Xs'
In this case, there would be only one negative eigen value, Ai = —S, and therefore
only one path in the (X, K, (3,1) space that leads to the steady state. ■
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Part 3
Not in Front of The Children: A Model
of Parental Influence on Self-Control
Abstract
In their "Willpower and Personal Rules". (2004), Benabou and Tirole build a self-signaling
model of personal rules based on self-reputation, in which people are uncertain about their
underlying willpower type but can infer it from their own past actions. However, in equilibrium
of their model, full spectrum of self-control outcomes can be achieved depending on agents'
initial beliefs, which remain exogenous. In this chapter, we put their self-signaling model in
the dynamic overlapping generations context, which provides a mechanism for the formation of
initial beliefs and generates heterogeneous behaviour among agents of the same type driven by
different parental choices. We show that, conditional on type, children of parents who exercised
more self-control during their lifetime, have higher self-confidence, exercise more self-control
themselves and are at least ex ante better off. We find that this heterogeneity persists from
two to infinite generations set-up with the long run fraction of population exercising self-control
being lower with the influence of parental behaviour than without. Introduction of parental
altruism retains the heterogeneity of children's behaviour but also induces parents to exercise
more self-control, especially when observed by children in later stages of their life.
1 Introduction
The existence of personal rules, such as diets, dry laws, exercise routines and the daily
earning targets of New York City cab drivers20, and their use as internal methods of
self-control pose a curious question for economics - insofar as these rules are purely
self-imposed and at least partially successful, how do they work? Consider a dieter
who has resolved to never eat dessert at dinner. Imagine that on day one of her diet
she is presented with a particularly decadent chocolate fondue. What incentive does
she have to stick to her self-imposed diet when this one piece of dessert will make no
difference to her weight or waistline? Why not have the dessert "just this once" and
resume the diet tomorrow? And if she succumbs to the fondue with this logic today,
what is to prevent her from doing the same tomorrow? More generally, in the absence
20Anecdotal evidence on personal rules abounds; research evidence includes Camerer (1997) on daily
earning rules of New York city cabdriver, and evidence on use of mental accounting rules from Thaler
(1980, 1985), Zelizer (1997), Heath and Soil (1996), Americs, Caplin and Leahy (2003)
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of external commitment, what provides the incentive for an individual to overcome the
pull towards immediate gratification and stick to the ex ante preferred internal rule,
when any single deviation would have only a negligible effect on the long term outcome?
In their "Willpower and Personal Rules" (2004), Benabou and Tirole provide an
answer to this question with a model of personal rules based on self-reputation. The
idea is that, if people are uncertain about their underlying willpower, they may try to
infer it from their own past actions, so that future beliefs about the strength of one's
will or self-control are directly influenced by current choices, which people may come
to regard as "indicative of what kind of person they are". At the same time, belief in
own willpower, and therefore ability to resist temptation, is needed in order to attempt
self-control in the first place. If the dieter does not believe she would be able to stick
to the diet tomorrow, the benefit of sticking to it today is rather reduced. Thus, the
motivation to maintain a positive self-image, driven by the preference for self-control in
the future, transforms current choices into potential 'precedents' for future behaviour,
and it is the fear of creating bad precedents, which diminish one's self-belief, that
provides the additional incentive to overcome the bias towards immediate gratification
and forego the fondue. Formalized in a self-signaling model of self-control, based on
hyperbolic discounting, imperfect knowledge of willpower and imperfect recall, the idea
of self-reputation provides a mechanism which can sustain rule-based behaviour. In
an important contribution to internal self-control literature, Benabou and Tirole are
able to characterise the beneficial "bright line" rules of self-control, as well as the
harmful compulsive behaviours, and make such curious predictions as the idea that
by inhibiting a build up of self-reputation, an initial period of externally enforced
controls can reduce the likelihood of individual attempting self-control in the future.
However, the main result of their model, which drives the subsequent predictions, is
that self-control is increasing with initial self-confidence, captured by initial beliefs
about own willpower. In fact, depending on initial beliefs, a full range of behaviour
can be sustained in equilibrium - from no self-control exercised by any type of agent,
regardless of underlying willpower type, to at least some self-control attempted by all
agents, even the weak-willed ones. Although central to determining the equilibrium
outcome, this initial self-confidence remains exogenous throughout the model. Yet,
the significance of initial beliefs to determining the outcome raises the question of how
people of similar type may come to have different initial beliefs.
In this paper we extend the Benabou and Tirole model by introducing a mechanism
which can endogenously generate different initial beliefs among agents of similar type.
We put the self-signaling model in the dynamic overlapping generations context, which
provides a mechanism for the formation of initial beliefs and generates heterogeneous
equilibrium behaviour among agents of the same type, driven by different parental
choices. We argue that if individuals are uncertain about their genetic traits, and if
such traits can be transmitted from parent to offspring, obseiving parents behaviour
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can reveal information about one's own type. In our set-up, children of those parents
who exercised more self-control have higher initial self-confidence than children of less
self-controlled parents. Then, conditional on type, this higher self-confidence leads the
children of self-controlled parents to exercise more self-control themselves. This hetero¬
geneity in beliefs and behaviour persists from two-generations to infinite-generations
set-up. We find that the fraction of children exercising self-control in the long run
(infinite generations) equilibrium is lower with observation of parental behaviour than
without, due to the fact that failures reveal more information than successes in this
self-signaling model. Insofar as more self-control leads to ex ante higher welfare in the
Benabou and Tirole model (for all but the weakest types), the children of the more self-
controlled parents are on average at least ex ante better off. Introduction of parental
altruism retains the heterogeneity of children's behaviour but also induces parents to
exercise more self-control when they are being observed by their children. The level of
self-control exercised by parents increases further when parents are observed by children
in the later stage of their life.
We believe that family background is an important and plausible source of initial
self-confidence for two reasons. Firstly, economic status is transmitted from parent to
offspring21. Bowles and Gintis (2001) show that the extent of intergenerational status
transmission is high, with some parent-offspring correlations exceeding Galton's original
estimate (two thirds) for height. As well as direct bequests and more relaxed credit
constraints, typical mechanisms for the transmission of economic status tend to reflect
the combined effects of genetic and cultural transmission of traits which contribute to
economic success, such as cognitive functioning, the degree of access to and quality
of education, and income-enhancing group memberships. However, bequests affect
only a small proportion of the population and the combination of genetic and cultural
inheritance, as well as educational attainment, although strongly significant, do not
fully explain the degree of wealth, income or social class persistence. Similarly, although
intergenerational correlations in IQ tend to be substantial22, they explain little of the
remaining intergenerational status correlations23. Mulligan (1997), for instance, shows
that a little more than two fifths of the association in status between parents and
children remains unexplained after controlling for a number of measures of educational
attainment and IQ, as well as standard demographic variables24.
However, it has been suggested that correlations in personality traits, such as work
2'This is the case whether status is measured by earnings, income, education, memebership of social
class, occupation, or wealth, although the extent of correlation varies somewhat with the type ofmeaure
used. (Bowles and Gintis, 2000)
22Black, Deveraux, Salvanes (2008); Bouchard and McGue (1981)
23Bowles and Gintis (2000) estimate that one tewentieth or less of the observed intergenerational
status transmission is due to genetic inheritance of IQ.
24 Similarly, Charles and Hurst (2003) find that almost 35% of intergenerational wealth elasticity
remains unexplained after controlling for income, asset ownership propensity, education, gifts and
expected bequests.
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efficacy, planning behaviours and discount rates, could go some way towards addressing
the gap in our understanding of status correlations. Knowles and Postelwaite (2005) ar¬
gue that if differences in savings behaviours among households of similar circumstances
can be explained by differences in basic personality traits, such as the discount rates,
then one would expect parents and children to share such traits, and so parental savings
behaviour should predict children's investment decisions; indeed, they find that parental
savings behaviour predicts both education and savings choices of children's households.
Insofar as discount rates can be viewed as a measure of self-control ability; intergenera-
tional correlation in discount rates imply correlations in self-control ability itself. This
is our second reason for taking an intergenerational approach to self-control. That self-
control contributes to economic well-being is uncontroversial: ability to overcome short
term impulses in favour of greater orientation towards the future allows the pursuit
of longer term goals, improves work ethic and has a positive effect on savings rates.
We argue further that correlations in self-control outcomes, and therefore potentially
wealth or status, are driven not only by correlations in actual self-control type, but also
by children's beliefs about own type as driven by parental choices. Thus, self-control
behaviours, which may lead to higher income outcomes among parents, instill better
initial self-confidence among children, and in turn lead to better self-control outcomes,
and therefore potential status, among the children's generation.
2 The Benabou and Tirole Model
In this section we outline the simplified version of the model as in Benabou and Tirole
(2004). We retain only the features necessary to convey the self-signaling intuition,
removing the self-serving memory and attribution problems. This framework rests on
two fundamental premises: imperfect knowledge of willpower and imperfect recall. In
the next section, we shall build on this model by introducing an overlapping generations
mechanism which will endogenise initial self-confidence.
An individual lives for two periods, t = 1,2 each of which is divided into two
subperiods, r = 1,2. At the beginning of each period, i.e. in subperiod 1, the
individual is presented with a self-control problem, in which he faces a trade-off between
immediate gratification and delayed, willpower-dependent reward. For example, an
individual wakes up in the morning and chooses whether to try and stick to a diet,
avoid smoking or alcohol for the day, or attempt to complete a piece of work. At this
point, the individual must choose between the following options.
1. Indulge in temptation immediately and not even attempt to exercise willpower
(AW). This yields a known instantaneous payoff a.
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2. Attempt to exercise willpower (W). In this case, at the beginning of subperiod
2 (e.g. the afternoon), the individual begins to experience the 'cravings' cost c
of the willpower activity. For instance, he may get hungry, tired or stressed as
the day goes by so that avoiding that indulgent snack or drink, or completing the
work he started becomes particularly difficult. The individual is now faced with a
further self-control problem. He can either persevere with his willpower activity
(P) and receive the payoff B — c at the end of period; or he can give up on his
attempt at willpower (G), and receive the payoff b, also at the end of the period.
The timing of the individual's choices and payoffs is depicted in Figure l25.
I\o-Willpower Option (NW)
benefit: a
Subperiod I Subperiod If
Give Up (G) ^ Delayed
Attempt Self-Control: ^ cost: 0 benefit: b
Willpower Activity (W) —
benefit: 0 Persevere (P) ^ Delayed
cost: c Benefit: B
Figure 1. Timing of Payoffs in Benabou and Tirole stage game.
Time
Evaluated ex-ante, it is assumed that willpower and perseverance are the best
option, some willpower is the second best option, and no willpower is the worst26:
a < b < B — c. Thus, ex-ante, the optimal choice is clear. What makes this a self-
control problem is the agent's discounting of the different payoffs at different points in
time: at the time of the decision, the agent tends to overestimate the magnitude of
immediate costs and benefits compared to the delayed ones. Specifically, the following
quasi-hyperbolic discounting structure is assumed:
• Individual discounts payoffs between periods 1 and 2 at a standard rate 6.
• Faced with immediate temptation payoff a (in every subperiod 1) the individual
discounts the future at an additional rate 7 < 1. Faced with an immediate
cravings cost c, the individual discounts the future at an additional rate f3 < 1,
which we refer to as the individual's strength of will throughout this chapter.
Further, individual can be of two types: a strong type (3H, or a weak type <
Ph-
25 Diagram taken from Benabou and Tirole (2004) p. 857
2<iThroughout this chapter we focus our attention on the case when even a little self-control is better
than none However, it is possible to conceive of situations where it is best not to start a self-control
activity at all, then start and give up (e.g. starting a firm), in which case payoffs to self-control may be
non-monotonic: a little self-control is the worst option, none is the second worst and a lot of self-control
is still the best.
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The above set-up differs from standard models of hyperbolic discounting in two
ways. Firstly, (3 and 7 refer to individual's cravings or strength of temptation in
different circumstances, and therefore need not be the same. Secondly, Benabou and
Tirole assume that whereas 7 is known at all times, (3 is not known ex ante and is
"revealed only through the experience of actually putting one's will to test". The
justification is that the individual knows his strength of will in resisting temptation
in normal times 7, but is unsure about his ability to resist in times of stress, which
can be either f3H < 7 or (3L < /3H. Indeed, psychological evidence shows that stress,
which could be caused by abstinence, proximity of cues which intensify the strength
of 'visceral' cravings, or external emotional circumstances can diminish individual's
ability to resist temptation. (Loewenstein, 1996, 1999).
The idea that (3 is not known ex ante - imperfect knowledge of willpower - is
the first fundamental premise of this self-signaling model. The second premise is
imperfect recall. Not only is (3 uncertain in advance, it also cannot be recalled through
introspection in period 2. It is this uncertainty about one's strength of will, both ex ante
and some time after the self-control choice, that allows the individual to infer his type
from his actions and provides the incentive for a signaling game between the agent's two
temporal selves. Although uncommon in text-book economics, the 'hot-cold empathy
gap', whereby the individual struggles to infer from 'cold' introspection the intensity
of 'hot' temptation, pain or stress, once again finds support in psychology (Kahneman,
Wakker, Sarin, 1997; Loewenstein, Sarin, 1999).
The introduction of the additional discount factors has the following effect on pay¬
offs:
Assumption 1.
(a) Evaluated ex ante, some self-control is better than none, a <b < B-c , but at the
time of decision, the individual overestimates the immediate temptation payoff,
so that:
b < — < B — c (2.1)
7
(b) If willpower is attempted, then in subperiod 2, perseverance P is the dominant
strategy for the strong types; for the weak types, giving up G would be the dominant
strategy in the absence of reputational concerns.
M
(c) If giving up in period 1 meant that at the beginning of period 2, no willpower,
NW would be chosen with certainty, the weak type would persevere in period 1 :
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— < B — b + 5(b — a)
Pl
where 8(b — a) is the maximum reputational stake.
(2.3)
Following Benabou and Tirole, we restrict attention to equilibria which satisfy the
assumption of monotonicity in beliefs. That is, recalling perseverance in period one
weakly raises the agent's second period beliefs, whereas recalling a lapse of self-control
weakly lowers them. In particular, this allows us to rule out the unnatural equilibrium
in which perseverance is such bad news that all types choose to give up. Denote by
A\=l the action taken by agent i in period one. Then, the updated second period beliefs
can be written as p2 — Pr(/3i = j A\=l = P), which is the posterior probability of
being a strong type following perseverance, and p2 = Pr(/3^ = (3H \ Alt=1 = G), which
is the posterior probability of being a strong type following giving up.
Assumption 2. Monotonicity in beliefs: p2 < Pi < p2 ■
The main result of the Benabou and Tirole model follows below.
Proposition 3.1 (Benabou and Tirole, Proposition 1, p. 863, without the self-serving
memory problem) For ^ < B — b+5(b—a), there is a unique equilibrium. If the agent's
initial self-confidence p^ is below a threshold pl(< p-f), he does not put his willpower to
test and chooses the NW option. If px > p\, the agent chooses W in the first period,
in which case (i) the strong type always perseveres and (ii), the weak type perseveres
with probability one for pl > p2, and with probability q\ —~^for p\ < p1 < p*2.
fhA ~ Pi)
In the second period, if G was observed in period 1, NW is chosen with certainty. If
P was observed in period 1, W is chosen with probability one for p1 > p*2 and with
probability p2 = tf Pl < Pi < Pr In the last subperiod, only the strong type
perseveres.
The intuition of this result is important for our extension so we explain it here.
Consider the agent's choice in the last stage of the game, t = 2, r = 2 : there are
no reputational concerns, so under Assumption l(f>), strong types persevere and weak
types give up. With this in mind, consider the agent s problem at the beginning of the
second period, t = 2, r = 1 : the agent does not recall his type and under Assumption
1(a), only chooses to attempt willpower W if he is sufficiently confident that he would
be able to carry it through and persevere at the end of the period. Thus, he attempts
willpower if his second period self-confidence, p2 = Pr(/3j Ph I At—fi), is above the
threshold p2, which solves (2.4) to equate the expected payoffs to II and AIT at the
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time of the decision:





Following Benabou and Tirole, we refer to the lower bound restriction on second
period beliefs, necessary for the agent to attempt willpower in the second period, as
the informativeness constraint:
Going back one step further to t = 1, r = 2, where his type is momentarily revealed
to the agent: given Assumption 1(6) and monotonicity of beliefs, it is the dominant
strategy for the strong type to persevere. For the weak type, the problem is more
complex. On the one hand, he is tempted to give up when experiencing the discounted
cravings cost, , but on the other, period two self-confidence provides the motivation
for attempting willpower at the beginning of the second period, which is ex ante de¬
sirable. As such, the period 2 self-belief is an asset worthy of protection in period 1.
Suppose that in equilibrium, W is chosen at t = 2, r = 1 with probability 0 < p2 < 1 if
P was played in the first period, and with zero probability otherwise. Then the weak
type would choose to persevere if
The left hand side of (2.6) is the disutility of resisting temptation at t = 1, r = 2,
and the right hand side is the gain in expected utility in period two from having higher
self-confidence. Conditional on initial beliefs, three types of equilibrium outcomes
could now arise.
Pooling on willpower and perseverance. Suppose the weak type were to persevere
at t = 1, r = 2 with probability one. Given that the strong type always perseveres,
this leaves the period two posterior beliefs unchanged, p2 = pv This can only be an
equilibrium if the initial self-confidence is already sufficiently high to induce the agent to
choose willpower in period two, i.e. the initial beliefs already satisfy the informativeness
constraint, p1 > p*2- Otherwise, if all types were to persevere in period one but initial
beliefs were low, p1 < p2, no-one would choose W in period two, which cannot be
optimal for the weak type, who only perseveres in the first period to gain confidence to
attempt self-control in the second period. Since ^ also the optimal choice
at the beginning of the first period when pi > p2-
Semi-Separation. With p\ < px < p2, the weak type has the incentive to partially




his peiiod two self-confidence high. In particular, the weak type will persevere with
probability q\ which makes observing P sufficiently good news to raise the updated
period two beliefs to p2. By Bayesian updating, his second period beliefs will be:
Pr(ft = pH | At=1 = P)= Pl = p*2 (2.7)
Pi + Qi(1 - Pi)
Solving (2.7) for q\, we have q\ — —~y- By randomizing with probability q\
between P and G in the first period, the agent makes his second period self indifferent
between W and NW, but for the agent to randomise in the first period, he must be
indifferent between P and G in the first place. Thus, the second period self randomises
with probability p2 which solves (2.6) with equality to achieve this indifference:
b-B + f-
V2 ~
S(b - a)L (2'8)
In this case, at the beginning of the game, t = 1, r = 1, the agent would choose W
over NW if p1 > p\ which satisfies:
p\(B -c + 6{p2{B - c) + (1 -p2)a))+ (2.9)
(1 - pl)(b + d(p2b + (1 - p2)a) = ^ + 5a
The left hand side of (2.9) is the ex ante expected payoff to choosing W initially
and playing the equilibrium strategy described above thereafter, given that the agent
believes to be a strong type with probability p\(< pt,)', and the right hand side gives
the payoff to playing NW in both periods. The latter option does not put the agent's
willpower to test and hence leaves the prior beliefs unchanged in period 2. Condition
(2.9) simplifies to:
_* a/y — 6 — 5p2{b — a) ^ /o inN
=
(B-c-wi + ik)<(2-10)
Pooling on NW. This occurs if p1 < p*, in which case initial self-confidence is so
low that no agent tries to put his willpower to test and {ATT; NW} is played.
Although the above equilibrium is unique in terms of strategy given beliefs, depend¬
ing on the initial beliefs, three outcomes can arise. With high initial self-confidence,
all types persevere in the first period and choose willpower in the second period; for
medium range of initial self-confidence, the strong types always persevere, the weak
types sometimes persevere, and every type randomises on willpower in period two;
for low values of initial self-confidence, no-one even attempts willpower. This depen¬
dence of equilibrium outcomes on initial beliefs raises the question of how these beliefs
may come about. We put forward an explanation based on building an overlapping
generations version of this model.
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3 Continuum of Types amendment of the Benabou and
Tirole Model
Before proceeding to overlapping generations, we introduce an important amendment
to the Benabou and Tirole model in assuming a continuum of agents on the interval
(0,1], who differ by the magnitude of their additional (hyperbolic) discount factor (3.
Specifically, rather than just having two types, (3H and f3L, we assume that an agent's
type (3 is drawn from a continuous distribution F((3), which has full support in the
interval (0, l]27. Each agent knows the distribution of types in the population but
not his own type. Agents play the stage game as in Benabou and Tirole (2004),
described in Section 2. We will show that this amendment (partially) purifies the self-
signaling equilibrium, simplifies it and reduces the counter-intuitive mixed-strategy
specific effects on the predictions of the overlapping generations model when parental
altruism is introduced.
When introducing a continuum of types into a model where the self-control choice
is essentially discrete, a new approach to classifying agents into groups which perform
similar actions is needed28. We call agent i a strong type if he perseveres in the
last subperiod, i.e. if /3j is such that B - j- > b. Then, all agents with > (3*,
where j3* = ^35, are of strong type. With monotonic beliefs, it remains the dominant
strategy for the strong types to persevere in the first period, too. We call agent i an
intermediate type if /3j < (3* and he perseveres in the first period when this leads to
willpower being chosen with probability one in the second period (and when giving up
leads to no willpower with certainty). For such an agent, choosing G at t — l,r = 2
yields b + 5a, and choosing P yields B - j- + 5b] thus all agents with ^ e [/3,(3*)
are of intermediate type, where ft = B-b+S{b-a) < is ^ last intermediate agent
who perseveres at t = l,r = 2 (agent /? is indifferent between P and G at t — 1,
t — 2). All agents with /3,: < (3 cannot be induced to persevere even by the prospect
of willpower with certainty in the next period (the maximum reputational stake). We
call such agents the weak types. We shall refer to an equilibrium in strategies, which
assign different actions to the intermediate types and the weak types when their type
is revealed to them in the first period, as a semi-separating equilibrium29.
2 7To avoid division by zero, we simply assume that the discount factor zero is not included in the
support. This also rules out the extreme type of agent who, faced with a cravings cost, attaches no
weight at all to the future.
28In the Benabou and Tirole (2004) model, action can only be a step-function of type, so the classi¬
fication into groups adds convenience.
29To the extent that we have three types of agents but only two possible actions at any information
set, an equilibrium of this model could never be completely separating. Since we are interested in
inducing agents other than the strong types to exercise self-contiol, we focus on the semi-separating







Denote by A\=-T=k the action chosen by agent i G (0,1] in period j € {1, 2}, subpe-
riod k e {1, 2}. Then, for any agent i, a strategy S) = {At=hT=1{p\), At=hT=2{p\, ft), At=2
At=2,r=2(Pi)} assigns an action for every information set in the game, conditional on
the agent's beliefs and (sometimes) type. At every subperiod t — 1, the agent does not
know his type and, for a given set of model parameters, his action is a function of his
beliefs alone; at t — 1, r = 2, his type is momentarily revealed to the agent and his
action is a function both of his beliefs and his revealed type; at t = 2, r = 2, action is a
function of type only. Although the game is not between different individuals but rather
between one agent's two temporal selves, the actions of other types of agents have an
effect on agent i's choices insofar as they affect his beliefs regarding the distribution of
types in the population.
Proposition 3.2 Consider the stage game of Benabou and Tirole (2004) Wllh a con¬
tinuum of types. Under Assumption 1(a) and monotonicity of beliefs, a semi-separating
equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the distribution of types in the popu¬
lation, F(/3), satisfies
(1 -F(/3*))(B-c+6{B-c))+ {F(P*)-F0)){B-c+6b)+F0)(b+Sa) > ± + 6a (3.1)
In this equilibrium, the following strategy profile S* is played:
• At t — 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if ft > p = B_b+5{b-a)- Give UP otherwise-
• At t = 2, r = 1 : If perseverance was observed at t = 1, t — 2, choose willpower
with probability 1. If giving up was observed, choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, r = 2 : Persevere if& > /3*. Give up otherwise.
If condition (3.1) does not hold, no agent attempts willpower in the first period and




Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1 with the amendments for
continuity of types, and can be found in Appendix A. ■
In Proposition 3.2 we construct a semi-separating equilibrium in pure strategies, in
which the strong types always persevere, the intermediate types persevere in the first
period but not the second and the weak types never persevere. In the second period, the
strong types and the intermediate types attempt willpower with probability one, and the
weak types with probability zero. Thus, in Proposition 3.2, we have purified the original
Benabou and Tirole result by introducing a continuum of agents on the interval (0,1].
To ensure existence of this equilibrium, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) must hold. Condition
(3.1) states that the expected payoff to attempting willpower in the first period (LHS),
given the agents continue to play according to the equilibrium strategy, must be at
least as large as the expected payoff to no willpower (RHS). This is necessary for a
separating equilibrium; if initial beliefs were too low to attempt willpower, all agents
would pool on NW. Condition (3.1) is therefore a restriction on the distribution of
types, which ensures that the initial beliefs are sufficiently favourable for all agents to
attempt willpower in the first period. However, it is easy to see that condition (3.1)
can be satisfied by any distribution which does not attach disproportionate amount
of weight to the bottom end of the support30. Condition (3.2) is the informativeness
constraint, which ensures that the updated second period beliefs following perseverance
are sufficient to induce agents to attempt willpower. Otherwise, the intermediate types
would not have the sufficient incentive to pool with the strong types by persevering, so
that S* cannot be an equilibrium.
In fact, Proposition 3.2 characterises the only possible pure semi-separating equi¬
librium in which the intermediate types pool with the strong types. To see this,
suppose condition (3.2) does not hold but there exists some strategy profile S', ac¬
cording to which all agents with & > /?'(> P) persevere at t = 1, r = 2, where /?'
solves = p\. Then in period 2, upon observing perseverance, agents wouldi r {fj j
be sufficiently confident to choose willpower. However, consider some agent j with
P < Pj < P', who according to S', does not persevere at t = 1, r = 2. This agent
would have an incentive to deviate: if he chose P at f = 1, r = 2, he would gain
sufficient confidence to choose willpower at t = 2, t = 1 given that beliefs are formed
according to S' (even though these beliefs are now incorrect), which is a profitable
deviation as long as B - ■& +6b > b + 6a, which is true for all > p. Thus, all
agents with ft < Pj < P' would have an incentive to deviate and so S' cannot be an
equilibrium.
30By Assumption 1(a), B-c+6(B-c) > a/i+5a and B-c+5b > a/j+Sa, and only b+Sa < a/-y+Sa.
Threfore, although specific examples would depend on model parameters, in principle any distribution
which does not attach "too much" weight to the interval (0, B_b + SQ_a)) would satisfy condition
3.1.
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Although there cannot be another pure semi-separating equilibrium when the in-
formativeness constraint in condition (3.2) does not hold, there can nevertheless be a
mixed one.
Proposition 3.3 Consider the stage game of Benabou and Tirole (2004) with a con¬
tinuum of types. Under Assumption 1(a) and with monotonic beliefs, a mixed strategy
semi-separating equilibrium exists if:
(1 - F(f3*))(B - c + 8{p2(B - c) + (1 - p2)a)) + (F(0*) - F{t3')){B - c + 8{p2b + (1 - p2)a))
(3.3)
3-F(/3')(b + 8a) > + 8a
and
l—F(/3') ~ P2 (3-4)
for some /?', where fl < [3' < (3*.
In this equilibrium, the following strategy profile Sm* is played:
• At t ~ 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t = 1, t = 2 : Persevere if pi > (3', where /3' solves = p\. Give up
otherwise.
• At t = 2, r = 1 : If perseverance was observed at t — 1, r = 2, choose willpower
with probability p2 — - • If giving UV was observed, choose no willpower.
• At t — 2, r = 2 : Persevere if fli > /3*. Giue up otherwise.
Moreover, when condition (3.3) holds with strict inequality , this mixed strategy
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.2 and can also be found in
Appendix A. ■
Proposition 3.3 describes the mixed equilibrium, which is the closest equivalent of
the original Benabou and Tirole result in the continuum of agents setting. In this
mixed equilibrium, agents randomise only in period 2: upon observing perseverance,
willpower is chosen with probability p2 < 1. Compared to the pure equilibrium, this
reduces the reputational stake in period 1, and therefore reduces the incentive for the
intermediate types to persevere. Therefore, the last agent to persevere at t = 1,
r = 2 in the mixed equilibrium is of type ft > f3, i.e. fewer intermediate type agents
persevere in the mixed equilibrium than in the pure. In fact, for agents to randomise
in period 2, the last agent to persevere in period 1 must make all second period selves
indifferent between willpower and no willpowei in period 2, so that the infoimativeness
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constraint holds with equality (hence condition (3.4)). Similarly, in period 2, agents
must randomise between W and NW with exactly the probability which makes agent
0' indifferent between P and G , i.e. v? = b~F+c!f' <5(6—a) "
Similar to condition (3.1), condition (3.4) ensures that initial self-confidence is suf¬
ficiently high for agents to attempt willpower at the beginning of the game, given Sm*
is played. When (3.4) holds with strict inequality, this is the only mixed equilibrium.
To see this, consider what happens if agents randomise between persevering and giving
up in the first period. The strong types and the weak types continue to play their
dominant strategies and will not randomise, but suppose there exists an equilibrium
in which the intermediate types randomise between P and G at t = 1, r = 2. Since
for all fii > ft, P yields a higher payoff than G if it's followed by W with certainty,
the middle types would also have to randomise at t — 2, r = 1 to make themselves
indifferent between P and G in the first period. Thus, we could imagine that the
middle types randomise with such a probability q\{00 at t — 1, r = 2 which makes
the second period self is indifferent between W and NWn, and with some probability
b-B + f
P2i — —7T, W at t = 2, t = 1, which makes the agent indifferent between P and G.
d(b - a)
The second period randomisation probability p2i must depend on 0i, since for every
type, there would be a different probability which makes him indifferent between P
and G at t — 1, r = 2. However, at t — 2, t = 1, the agent cannot recall his type, and
therefore cannot condition his second period actions on his type 0i. Thus, any strategy
which involves the middle types randomising at t = 1, r = 2, cannot be an equilibrium.
So far, we have established that two different types of separating equilibria can occur
depending on the distribution of types. When there is a relatively large mass at the
top of the types distribution and model parameters are such that it is possible to have
l-F(/3*) > * pUre equilibrium of Proposition 3.2 is played. When the distribution
of types given the model parameters is not sufficiently favourable for the existence
of pure semi-separating equilibrium, < Pz> a mixed equilibrium could still be
played as long as there exists some 0' such that = P\- Due to the reduced
reputational stake, the last agent to persevere in the mixed equilibrium of Proposition
3.3 is of stronger type than the last agent to persevere in the pure equilibrium of
Proposition 3.2, 0' > 0. It follows that the pure and the mixed equilibria do not
overlap: if > p*, there can only be a pure equilibrium (since in this case it is
not possible to have = p\ with 0 < 0')\ conversely, we have already shown that
there can be no pure equilibrium when < P*2' Finally' when the distribution
of types is so unfavourable that even condition (3.4) does not hold, there can only be
a pooling equilibrium on NW.





To the extent that the initial distribution of types corresponds to the initial beliefs
in the one generation case, our findings with a continuum of types so far mirror the
original results of Benabou and Tirole: the degree of self-control exercised in equilib¬
rium is increasing with initial beliefs, which are determined by the initial distribution
of types. However, we have partially 'purified' the original Benabou and Tirole model,
having established the existence of a pure strategy semi-separating equilibrium. In
the remainder of this paper, we shall focus on the pure equilibrium wherever possible,
however, the existence of two different equilibria depending on initial beliefs, will be¬
come useful when we come to describe potential differences in the behaviour of children,
depending on the amount of self-control exercised by their parents.
4 Overlapping Generations Model with a Continuum of
Types
In the Benabou and Tirole (2004) model, described above, initial beliefs are critical
in determining the self-control outcome. We propose to endogenise these beliefs by
putting the basic model into an intergenerational set-up. Our extension is based on the
same premises as the original Benabou and Tirole, namely imperfect knowledge of own
willpower and imperfect recall, plus one more - a degree of genetic heritability of traits.
In an environment where underlying traits are uncertain but actions are observable,
genetic inheritance implies that children's expectations about their own type can be
partially based on observing their parents' behaviour.
Suppose now that populations can reproduce. Reproduction is asexual so that
each family consists of one parent and one child, and each generation is a continuum
of agents on (0,1]. Borrowing from the learning literature, we assume the following
inheritance (mutation) mechanism: with probability 9, the child inherits exactly his
parent's type; with probability 1 - 9 his type is a random draw from the distribution
of types of the parent population. This structure implies that there is a probability
mass on the child being very similar to the parent, but the child could also mutate into
any other type in the population. Note that under this assumption, the distribution
of the parents' types and the children's types will be the same32.
We also assume that agents now live for three periods: in periods 1 and 2 they play
the stage game described above, but there is an additional period 0 in which children
observe the actions of their parents. Children's period 0 coincides with parents' period
32Given the inheritance mechanism, the distribution of children s types G-(/3) will be . G(/3)
Pr(/3 h id < 0) = 6F(l3) + (1 - O)F(0) = F(fi). Intuitively, what is the probability that a child's type
is below some /?'? Either the child's parent was himself a type below ff and the child inherited his
type, or the parent was a type above /?' and the child did not inherit his type but rather was drawn on
the part of the parental distribution below (5 .
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1. Children do not know their own nor their parents' type but infer it from behaviour.
Children form initial beliefs about their own type through Bayesian updating, by com¬
bining the information they have on their parents' choices and the distribution of types
(and strategies) in the population as a whole. To start with, we assume that children
observe only the first period actions of their parents, and not the second. The intuition
is that children are exposed to parents' choices while they live at home, but once they
move out, parents' actions become more difficult to observe. We shall consider the
effects of relaxing this condition in the next section.
Assumption 3. (a) Any generation k 6 {2,3,...} directly observe t — 1, r = 2
actions of their parents only. (b) The equilibrium strategies of all generations are
common knowledge^.
4.1 Two Generations
We start by considering the case of just two generations: the first generation of parents
and the second generation of children. For the moment, we assume that parents derive
no additional utility from the welfare of the child - there is no parental altruism. We
investigate how the information revealed through parents' choices can lead to different
initial self-confidence, and therefore different self-control choices, among their children.
With no parental altruism, the behaviour of the parents' generation is identical to
that of the single agent, described in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 of the previous section.
To see how differences in parents' behaviour can affect children's choices, we need het¬
erogeneity of behaviour on the parents' side in the first place, and therefore assume that
parents play a semi-separating equilibrium, i.e. the distribution of types is sufficiently
high for parents to attempt willpower in the first period. Further, for the purpose
of finding the purest equilibrium possible, we assume that the semi-separating equilib¬
rium of the parents' generation is pure. As will become clear shortly, this assumption
does not fundamentally affect children's behaviour, but it will become important once
parental altruism is introduced.
Assumption 4. Parents' generation play the pure semi-separating equilibrium
S* of Proposition 2, and therefore:
(a) (l-F(/3*))(B-c+5{B-c))+ {F(/3*)-F0))(B-c+5b)+F0)(b+8a) > ±+5a;
(b) IzZm > p*.y > 1 -F(0) - H2
33Since in this model the game is not between different agents but rather between agents' temporal
selves, the extra assumption on common knowledge of other agents' strategies is needed to enable
agents to make inference about their parents , and hence their own, type.
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With this in mind, let's consider how the second generation's initial beliefs are
formed. Since children know their parent's first period choices but not their type, they
must make the same inference about their parent's type as the parent's second period
o| p Olf1
self. Denote by p1 and p1 initial beliefs of the second generation children whose
parents persevered and gave up, respectively.
Lemma 3.1 Children of persevering parents have higher initial self-confidence than
children of parents who had given up: p^P > pfG.
The lemma follows immediately from the derivation of children's' beliefs. Denote
by fiki the type of the individual from dynasty i in generation k, where k = 1,2.
Further, denote by A\L1t_2 the action selected by agent i's parent at t = 1, r = 2.
Under Assumption 4, if agent i observed his parent persevere, he knows his parent is a
strong type with probability Then, agent i's probability of being a strong typei—t (p)
is the sum of the probability of inheriting his parent's type in the case that the parent
was in fact a strong type, plus the probability that he is drawn on the high part of the
distribution. Agent i's initial beliefs, conditional on his parents persevering, can be
written as:
pY = Pr(/32j > /3* | A]11iT=2 = P) = d'fW- + (1 - 0)(1 - (4.1)
= TSw(1-(1"0)i?(^))
If, on the other hand, agent i observed his parent give up, he knows with certainty
his parent is not a strong type, and so the only hope for agent i himself to be a strong
type is if he is randomly drawn on the high part of the distribution.
pfG = Pr(/32i > /T | A]U)T=2 = G) = (1 - 0){ 1 - F(j3*)) (4-2)
It is clear from (4.1) and (4.2) that p?G < 1 - F(j3*) < pfP for all 6 ^ 0 and
P < P* ■
We are interested in how this difference in initial beliefs due to observing parents'
choices and some degree of heritability, can affect children's behaviour. In the first pe¬
riod, it remains the dominant strategy for the strong types to persevere, so their choices
are not directly affected by parents' behaviour, provided their initial self-confidence is
not lowered to the extent that they do not even put their willpower to test. It also
remains the case that the very weak types with Pt < P cannot be induced to persevere
no matter how high their initial beliefs are. However, the first period behaviour of
the intermediate types, and in particular their choice between persevering and giving
up, strongly depends on their initial beliefs and can therefore be affected by parents
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behaviour. In addition, parental choices have the potential to affect second period
behaviour of both the strong and the intermediate types by influencing whether these
agents have sufficient self-confidence to attempt willpower with any probability.
Proposition 3.4 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, and with monotonicity of beliefs, there
exists a semi-separating equilibrium in pure strategies for generation 2. In this equilib¬
rium, children of persevering parents play the following strategy S2 :
• At t = 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if f32i > P- Give up otherwise.
• At t = 2, r = 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period; otherwise, choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, r = 2 : Persevere if /32i > P* ■ Give up otherwise.
Children of giving-up parents play the following strategy S2 ■
• At t = 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower if
(1 - 0)(1 - F{p*)){B -c + 5p2(B - c) (4.3)
+(1 - p2)a) + (1 - 0)(F(J3*) - F(P"))(B - c + 5(p2b + (1 - p2)a))
+ [9 + (1 - 6)F(0")] (b + Sa)>^ + 5a
• At t = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if P2i > P*. Persevere if P2i > P and ^ >
p*2 , or if P2i > p" and if )} < P2 but )} = P2 for some
P" € 0,P*). Give up otherwise.
• At t — 2, t = 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period and ^ > P%i Choose willpower with probability
/-l M/1 Ft ft*}}
p2 if willpower was observed in previous period and1= Otherwise,
choose no willpower.
• Att = 2,r = 2: Persevere if P2i > P*. Give up otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 can be found in Appendix A.
In Proposition 3.4, we show that heterogeneous equilibrium behaviour, driven by
different parental choices, is possible among children of the same willpower type. In
equilibrium of Proposition 3.4, children of persevering parents play the same pure strat¬
egy as the first generation - although these children have higher initial beliefs than their
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parents, they cannot do better than their parents as the self-control choice is discrete
and, by assumption, parents already play the pure strategy that yields the highest
self-control outcome. Children of giving up parents can also play this pure strategy
but only as long as their updated second period beliefs satisfy the informativeness con¬
straint, -—^ > p2, which would be more binding for the children of giving up
parents as their initial self-confidence is lowered by observation of low self-control be¬
haviour among their parents. Then, if the distribution of types in the population is not
sufficiently favourable, and/or the degree of type heritability is large, the pure strat¬
egy informativeness constraint may not be met for the children of giving up parents,
inducing them to play the mixed strategy instead.
In the latter case, when ^ ^ < P2, conditional on type, children of giving
up parents exercise less self-control than children of persevering parents in equilibrium
of .Proposition 3.4. This effect is two-fold. First, fewer children of giving up parents
persevere in the first period: the weakest child of persevering parent to persevere is
(3, whereas the weakest child of giving up parent to persevere is (3" > /3. Second,
conditional on persevering in the first period, children of persevering parents choose
willpower with probability one in the second period, whereas children of giving up
parents only choose willpower with probability P2 < 1- Thus, a fraction of children
of giving up parents with /32i € W,P") do not persevere in equilibrium even though
they would have, had they not observed their parents' low self-control choices. More
so, even following perseverance, children of giving up parents choose the no willpower
option with probability 1 — P2 in the second period, even if they are of strong type.
Finally, in the most extreme case when the distribution of types does not have a large
mass at the top, and/or heritability is large, so that even condition (4.3) does not hold,
children of giving up parents do not even attempt willpower in the first period. Once
again, this includes the strong types.
4.2 Multiple Generations
So far, we have established that, conditional on type, children of giving up parents
may exercise less self-control than children of persevering parents in the two-generation
case. We will use this result to extend the two generations case to an infinite number
of overlapping generations to find the limiting distribution of the self-control choices
in the population. With multiple generations, the question of exactly what consti¬
tutes children's initial beliefs becomes important. On the hand, children could have
'short memory' and observe only their parents' behaviour but know nothing about their
grandparents. On the other, children could learn their entire family history and dynas¬
ties based on beliefs could form. We start off by considering the former (as captured
by Assumption 3).
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For some generation k 6 {2,3,...}, consider how agents' initial beliefs are formed.
As in the two-generation case, if children observed their parents give up, they know
with certainty their parents were not a strong type and therefore, their initial beliefs
will be:
pT = Pr(/3fcj > /3* | A£-1t)12 = G) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(f3*)) = PT = P? (4.4)
Observing one's parents give up is a sufficient statistic of a sort. From the child's
perspective, it does not matter what their grandfather did as they can be certain their
father was not a strong type. Thus, starting with generation two, the initial beliefs of
children of giving-up parents are constant across generations.
The inference of children of persevering parents is somewhat more involved. Under
Assumption 3, children of persevering parents can no longer make the same inference as
their parent's second period self as they do not know whether their father himself came
from a persevering or giving-up family. However, in addition to observing their parent's
choice, children also know the strategy played by the population, and can therefore still
form a prior on their parent being a strong type. Denote by Aj(Sj) the proportion
of generation j that perseveres at t — 1, r = 2 when the strategy S = {Sj}^ is
played by the population. Then, the initial beliefs of children of persevering parents
in generation k will be:
d|P = p^m > Fi = n = <U:X',) + (i - »>(i - (4.5)
We turn now to determining Aj(Sj).
Proposition 3.5 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, monotonicity of beliefs and if condition
(4.3) holds, then, from generation 2 onwards, agents play according to the strategy
1-F0) < p2 (4.6)
then the fraction of generation k persevering is:
Afc = (1 - F(0W + (! - 0)(F((3") - F0))]k-1 + 1~F{0") (4.7)1-(F(J3")-F0))
and in the limit:
81
Proof. Suppose the strategy profile {Sp, SG} = {Sp, SG} is played in every generation
k 6 {2,3,...}. Suppose further that condition (4.3) holds and all agents attempt
willpower in the first period, and assume for the moment that beliefs are such that
the relevant informativeness constraints are satisfied for all generations k 6 {2,3,...}.
Then, by construction, the strategy profile {Sp, SG} is sequentially rational as it is
not possible for any agent to do better than play according to {SP,SG}, provided
their beliefs are consistent with {SP,SG}. This is the result of the fact that the
strong types and the weak types play their dominant strategies and the intermediate
types already persevere and choose willpower as frequently as possible in {Sp, SG}.
Therefore, to show that {S^S*0} constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
infinite overlapping generations game, we need to show that beliefs are consistent with
{SP,SG} for all k e {2,3,...}.
As already established in equation (4.4), the initial beliefs of children of giving-up
parents are the same across all generations, starting with generation 2. Therefore, in
any generation k, children of giving up parents cannot do better than play according
to SG = SG. On the other hand, from equation (4.5), the initial beliefs of children of
persevering parents depend on the proportion of parents' generation persevering. In
generation k :
P1IP = Pr(/3fcj > /r I AI\%2 = P) = gA^;gfj0) + (i - *o(i - nn) (4.8)
Suppose such children play according to Sp and therefore persevere at t = 1, r = 2
if Pki — P- Then their second period beliefs, conditional on perseverance, would be:
a iv <0 1 +(i-e)(i-n3*))
Pr(f3ki > p* | A^U,t=2 = P, 4=&2 = P)= ( IfCv (4'9)
For this to be an equilibrium, the updated second period beliefs in (4.9) must
satisfy the informativeness constraint, i.e. we must have i-f0) — p2-
Recall that we assumed that the updated second period beliefs of the first generation
satisfied the informativeness constraint, > p\- Then, the updated second
period beliefs of generation 2, conditional on perseverance, necessarily also satisfied the
9\ . i_F(0n .
informativeness constraint — p?' s^nce ^ 1-f0) + — —
> 1 - F(P*). In fact, it is clear that the informativeness constraint is satisfied
for all generations &, since for any A& < 1, 6 xk_j(s) T (1 — 0)(1 — F(f3 )) > 1 — F(/3 ),
and therefore, ° Xk~'(S) ^ ~ > Pb Provided > p*2- Moreover, Xk <
1 - F{P) Vic as no agent with (3 < ft would ever persevere, no matter how high their
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beliefs might be.
Next, we determine Ak. If the strategy profile {Sp,Sis played, then the propor¬
tion of people persevering in any generation k consists of children of giving-up parents
with /3k, > f3" and children of persevering parents with /3ki > /3 :
Xk = Xk-i Pv(Pki > 0 | A^l2 = P) + (1 " Afe-i) Pr(/3fci > /?" \ = G)
(4.10)
= Afc_x[0 + (1 - 0)(1 - F0))] + (1 - Afc_1)(l - 0)(1 -
= Xk^[6 + (1 - 0)(F(/3") - F(^))] + (i - fl)(i _ F(/3"))
Equation (4.10) is a simple first order linear difference equation; its general solution
is:
Afc = M[d + (1 - 0)(F((i") - F0))]k + ^,\nFC0)) (4-11)





Substituting back into (4.11), we have:
Afe = (1 — F0W + (1 - *)W) - ^(^))]fc_1 + (413)
Since {F(/3") - E(/3)) < 1 and therefore [0 + (1 - 9)(F(/3") - E(/3))] < 1, taking the
limit to infinity of (4.13), we have:
Um A* = (1 - F0)) Km [6 + (1 - 0)(F(/3") - F^))]*"1 + (4.14)
= 1—F(/3")
l-[F{fi")-F(fi)]
It is trivial to see that < 1 " F6®) as long 35 F^'"> > "
Proposition 3.5 states that from generation two onwards, all agents play the same
strategy profile, {SP,SG}. The intuition is that children of giving-up parents have
the same initial beliefs regardless of which generation they occur in, and so cannot
do better than play SG■ Children of persevering parents have weakly increasing initial
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beliefs across generations, but since all intermediate (and strong) children of persevering
parents in generation 2 already persevere and play a pure strategy in the second period,
they cannot improve on the second generation strategy either.
As in the two generation case, in the multiple generations equilibrium children of
persevering parents exercise more self-control than children of giving-up parents. There
remains a fraction of the population - children of giving up parents with 0 < 0^ < 0"
who do not persevere in equilibrium because their self-confidence is lowered by watching
their parents give up. In the long run, the fraction of the population persevering settles
to a steady state, i which is lower than the proportion of all agents who
would have an incentive to persevere when their beliefs are not conditioned by parents'
behoviour' i-|rOT-F(j)| < 1 ~ F(m-
In Proposition 3.5 we assumed that children have short memory and observe or
recall only the actions of their immediate parent, and not of any further ancestors.
However, it is clear from the proof of this proposition that even if children could recall
the entire family history, the result would be the same. The only reason family history
could matter is if a history of perseverance improved the child's self-confidence and
if this higher self-confidence translated into more self-control. However, children of
giving up parents know with certainty that their parents were not of strong type, so
that knowing the behaviour of the grandfathers has no effect on the initial beliefs of
these children. For children of persevering parents, their initial beliefs do in fact
increase with the length of the spell of perseverance in the family history, but this does
not result in more self-control simply because even children with only the immediate
parent (and not parent's parent) persevering have sufficient self-confidence to persevere
in the first period for all 0{ > 0 and choose willpower with probability one in the second
period, conditional on observing perseverance. This is the best possible outcome so
even agents with higher initial beliefs cannot do better than that. This results from
the fact that self-control choice is discrete and only an increasing step function of initial
beliefs. If the amount of self-control exercised were a continuous choice, family history,
and particularly the length of spells of perseverance, would matter, all else equal.
5 Overlapping Generations Model with Parental Altru¬
ism
In this section we extend our basic set-up to account for a form of paternalistic altru¬
ism, or intergenerational empathy, in which children's welfare may enter directly into
parents' utility. Then, in addition to parents' choices having an effect on children's
choices, through their initial beliefs, expected children's behaviour may have an effect
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on parents' behaviour. In particular, if giving up on willpower reveals the parent as be¬
ing a weak type and consequently lowers his offspring's initial self-confidence, a parent
who cares about his child's wellbeing may have an additional incentive to persevere.
5.1 Two Generations with Parental Altruism
We start off again by considering the case of two generations only: a first generation
of parents followed by a second generation of children. We continue to assume that
children observe period one actions of their parents. We now also assume that the
anticipated children's utility enters directly into parents' payoffs at t — 1, r = 2.
Denote by E[u2i(S2i) j /3U, A\0 r=2] the parent's expectation of his child's utility
when the parent chooses action Au at t — 1, r = 2 and the child plays the strategy
S2l\ this expectation is taken at t = 1, r = 2, when the parent's type is momentarily
revealed to the parent, so it is conditional on parent's type, /3U. Then, for a parent
of type Pm, the period 1 payoff to G becomes b + p,E[u2i(S2l) | /3U,G] and to P,
B — c/(3u + pE[u2l(S21) | /3U,P], where p, £ [0,1] is a discount factor which accounts
for imperfect empathy between parents and children34.
When children observe the first period choices of their parents, it is the parents'
choice between P and G that determines the child's initial beliefs. We therefore think
it reasonable that the anticipated child welfare should enter parents' utility at the time
of the relevant choice, i.e. at t = 1, r = 2. We refer to this scenario as anticipatory
empathy. One might argue that it is the actual child's utility that should enter into
parents' utility when children make their choices, but insofar as parents make their
first period choices before children start to make any decisions, it is still the children's
expected welfare that will affect the parents' choice between P and G.
Proposition 3.6 Under Assumption 4, monotonic beliefs and if the distribution of
types, F0), satisfies
(1 - F0*))(B — c + 5(B — c)) + (F{/3*) - F0))(B -c + 5b) + F0)(b + 5a) (5.1)
T/r(l — 9) x
(1 - F0)) (1 - F{/3*)){B - c + 5(B - c)) + {F{/3*) - F0)){B -c + 5b) + F0)(b + 5a)
(1 - F(/3*)){B - c+ 5(p2{B - c) + (1 -P2)a))
+(F0*) - F(f3"))(B - c + 5(p2b + (1 - p2)a)) + F{(d"){b + 5a) _
+p6 (1 - F(/3*))(B — c + 5(B — c)) + (F{(3*) - F0))(B -c + 5b) + F0){b + 5a)
> ^ + 5a + p{l + 5)a
+F0)






f3 — c{B — b + 6(b — a)+
/i(l - 0)[<J(1 - p2)[(l - F{j3*)){B - c - a) + (F(/T) - F(/?"))(6 - a)]+
(F(/3") - F(P))(B — c — b + 6(b — a))]}"1
(5.3)
a semi-separating equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, parents play the strategy
Sf, according to which they:
• Att = 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if f3u > ~j3, where < (3. Give up otherwise.
• rii t = 2, r = 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period; otherwise, choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, t — 2 : Persevere if /3U > /3*. Give up otherwise.
Children's generation play according the strategy profile S^}, which is the same
as in Proposition (3-4)■
Proof of Proposition 3.6 can be found in Appendix B.
In Proposition 3.6, we show that in the equilibrium of a two-generation game,
parental altruism raises the self-control outcomes of the parents' generation, with an
additional fraction of parents, F((3) — F(/3), persevering in the first period and there¬
fore attempting willpower in the second. The increased incentive for self-control comes
from the fact that parental perseverance raises children's initial self-confidence, which
improves the self-control outcomes in the children's generation and therefore raises
parents' expectation of children's utility. Since this game ends with generation two,
children's payoffs are not affected by altruism and they continue to play the same strat¬
egy profile {Ff,^} as ^ bef°re altruism was introduced. The only difference
is that the initial beliefs of children of altruistic parents are somewhat lower than of
non-altruistic parents. This is due to the fact that altruism is common knowledge
and children of persevering parents rationally deduce that some weaker parents would
have persevered precisely in order to induce higher beliefs among their children. Still,
since we continue to assume that the parents' informativeness constraint is satisfied
sufficiently for them to play a pure strategy following perseverance (condition (5.2)
holds), the informativeness constraint will also necessarily be satisfied for children of
persevering parents, who would also play a pure strategy. Equilibrium would still be
possible if condition (5.2) did not hold, and children would continue to play the same
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strategy, although they would have slightly higher initial beliefs. However, in the case
of altruism, the assumption that parents play a pure strategy becomes non-trivial in
the sense that it affects the direction in which the introduction of children's utility af¬
fects parental self-control outcomes. As we will show in the next section, introduction
of parental altruism can actually reduce the amount of self-control exercised by the
parents if parents play a mixed strategy.
For parents to even reach the second information set, condition (5.1) ensures that
the distribution of types and therefore the initial beliefs of the first generation, are
sufficiently high for parents to attempt willpower. Otherwise a pooling equilibrium
would be played in which no willpower was chosen in both generations. In the case
that parents attempt willpower but children of giving up parents have insufficient self-
confidence to try willpower themselves, a pure semi-separating equilibrium is possible.
In this equilibrium an even larger fraction of parents persevere, since giving up has
a more punitive effect on the expected self-control outcomes, and therefore utility, of
children.
5.2 Multiple Generations with Parental Altruism
{
Suppose now there is an infinite number of overlapping generations, so that all children
are also parents who have their own children. With infinite generations, even if it is
only the utility of the immediate offspring that enters directly into parent's utility, the
children will also care about their own children, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, any
parent will by default care about the discounted utilities of all of his future descendants.
Suppose all generations k = {1,2,...} play according to the strategy profile {Sjfcli-
Denote by Vk+lti(/3ki, A^L1t=2, S'(fc+1)l) the expected utility of all future generations in
dynasty i, starting in generation k + 1, from the perspective of agent k in dynasty i,
who is of type hi and chooses action Akl at t = 1, r = 2.
Proposition 3.7 Under Assumption (4), monotonic beliefs and if the distribution of
types, F(/3), satisfies
(1 - 6>)(1 - F(/3*))(B - c+ 8p2(B - c- a) + juV(/3 > /3*,P))
+(1 - 9){F{j3*) - F(P"))(B — c + Sp2(b — a) + pV(/3" < (3 < (3*,P))





\ *^ P2 (5.5)
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a stationary semi-separating equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, from generation
two onwards, all generations play the strategy profile {SeP, SeG}. In any generation
k 6 {2, 3,children of persevering parents play the following strategy SeP:
• At t = 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• Att = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if fiki > /3. Give up otherwise.
• At t = 2, t — 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period; otherwise, choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, r = 2 : Persevere if fiki > /3*. Give up otherwise.
Children of giving-up parents play the following strategy SeG :
• At t — 1, t = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t — 1, r = 2 : Persevere if fiki > (3 and ^ > P2 > or if P2i > ft"
and if < P2 but ^~\-F(p") }) = P*2 for some P" € 0,P*)- Give up
otherwise.
• At t — 2, r = 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period and ^ ^ P\l Choose willpower with probability
P2 if willpower was observed in previous period and ^ = P*i- Otherwise,
choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, r = 2 : Persevere if fiki > /3*. Give up otherwise.
Where,




V% = 1 5(6-o)(1-aiL>) (5-7)
where D = 9 + (1 - 0)(F(/T) - F(^)) + (1 - 0)(1 - F{F))Sf*=*.
Generation 1 play the same strategy as children of persevering parents, SeP.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 can be found in Appendix B.
In Proposition 3.7, we describe the stationary semi-separating equilibrium of the
infinite generations game with parental altruism. We show that parental altruism
raises the fraction of population that perseveres in the first period by an additional
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F{0) — F(/3) in every generation. More so, a larger fraction of children of persevering
parents themselves persevere in the first period than either in the two-generation or no-
altruism case, since parental actions can now have an effect on all future generations35,
i.e. /?</?</3. The fraction of children of giving-up parents who persevere in this
equilibrium, 1 — F(/3"), is the same as in the two-generation and no-altruism case, as
it is driven by the same informativeness constraint. As a result, we also find that
parental altruism raises the faction of the population that perseveres in the long run:
Although the fraction of children of giving up parents who persevere is unchanged,
the probability with which these agents then choose willpower in the second period is
actually reduced, p% < P2 ■ This somewhat counterintuitive outcome is the result of the
fact that children of giving-up parents play a mixed strategy: because the anticipated
children's utility enters into parent's utility at t — 1, r = 2 and is greater for the children
of persevering parents than of giving up, for the /3" agent to remain indifferent between
P and G, he must select willpower following P with a lower probability in the second
period. In other words, the additional utility gained from children's welfare following
parental perseverance, reduces the value of reputational stake needed to compensate
agent /3" for costly perseverance in the first period. Such parents substitute future
children's welfare for utility gained form exercise of additional self-control in later stage
of their life.
5.3 Late Parenthood
When children's welfare enters into parents' utility, the timing of the overlap between
parents' and children's generations, and therefore which actions children observe and
when parents 'experience' children's utility, becomes potentially important. We there¬
fore investigate an alternative assumption on the timing of the overlap: rather than
children observing period one actions of their parents, we now assume that children
are born one period later so that children's period zero, in which they only observe,
coincides with parents' period two. The question is whether children's monitoring of
the second half of the parents' life can induce the parents to exercise more self-control
throughout their lifetime.
For simplicity, we return to the two generation case. Denote by E[v%f(S2t) |
Pli, A\L2 t=o] the expectation of /3U parent of his child's utility given that the parent
chooses action A\i2)T=2 at t = 2,r = 2 and the child plays according to strategy S2\
35Since V(/3, P) > V(/3, G) in all generations since parental perseverance weakly increases the proba¬
bility of child perseverance, it must be that V(f3, P) — V{fi,G) > E[u2i(P,S ) | /?] — E[v,2i(G, S ) | /3]
fo all 0/0.
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Proposition 3.8 Under Assumption (4), monotonic beliefs and if the distribution of
types; F(0), satisfies
(1 - F{0**)){B - c + S(B — c + pE[uiP{S2P) \ 0U > 0**, P})) (5.8)
+(F{0**) - F0))(B ~c + 5(b + pE[uiP{S2G) \ 0 < 0U < (3**, G]))
+F(0)(b + 5a + pE[uiP{SNW) \ 0U < 0, NW)) > * + Sa + (1 + S)a
and
> n* /c q\
l-min{fCP).F(/3**)} ~
a semi-separating equilibrium exists. In the equilibrium, parents will play according
to the strategy Spp :
• At t = 1, r = 1 : Attempt willpower.
• At t = 1, r = 2 : Persevere if 0U > min{/3, /?**}. Gwe up otherwise.
• j4i t = 2, r = 1 : Choose willpower with probability 1 if perseverance was observed
in the previous period; otherwise, choose no willpower.
• At t = 2, r = 2 : Persevere if fin > 0**, where 0** < 0*. Give up otherwise.
Children will play according to the strategy profile {S2W, SG, Sp} where SG and
Sp are as before, and S'^W and SG are equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 3.8 can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.8 states that when children observe the second period actions of their
parents, all parents with 0U > 0**, where 0** < 0*, persevere at the end of the second
period. Having children observe the second period provides the (intergenerational)
reputational effect that was otherwise absent at the end of the game. Thus, in period
one, intermediate types persevere in order to induce favourable beliefs in their own
future selves, and in period two, some intermediate types persevere in order to induce
higher beliefs in their children. Whether under successive generations children have
an effect on parents' period one behaviour is ambiguous. If 0** > 0, then only those
parents with 0U > 0 persevere in the first period, which is the same threshold level as
in the no altruism case. If 0** < 0, then all parents with 0U > 0** persevere in both
periods. This outcome can arise when the difference between expected utilities of
children of persevering and giving up parents is larger than the maximum reputational
stake that can be attained by agent in the absence of effects on children. This is possible
when the differences in payoffs to persevering and giving up is considerably larger
than between giving up and not attempting willpower, and when the intergenerational
discount factor p is high, and it implies that even some of the weak types who would
never persevere without altruism, persevere in both periods.
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Although we continue to focus on the equilibria in which parents play a pure strat¬
egy; which is the reason we always assume that > p\-, where /3 is the last parent
with an incentive to persevere in the first period, the mixed version of the parents'
strategy is worth a mention in this case. As we showed in the proof of Proposition
3.8, the introduction of discounted child welfare into parents' utility in the second pe¬
riod has the effect of lowering the minimum level of self-confidence required to attempt
willpower in the second period, pf < p\. In a mixed equilibrium, this can potentially
allow more parents to persevere in the first period whilst keeping the second period
self-confidence at its new threshold level, pf, which in turn increases the probability
with which the second period selves attempt willpower. In the last subperiod, all
parents with /3U > j3** persevere. Thus, if parents originally play a mixed strategy,
the introduction of children's monitoring of parental actions in period two increases the
amount of self-control exercised by the parents at every information set.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed an overlapping generations version of the Benabou and
Tirole (2004) self-signaling model of personal rules to see how parental behaviour can af¬
fect self-control outcomes of their children. We find that children ofmore self-controlled
parents have higher initial self-confidence, which conditional on type, leads them to ex¬
ercise more self-control themselves. We find the fraction of the population who do
not persevere in the long run equilibrium simply because their initial self-confidence
is lowered by observation of poor parental choices. Further, introduction of parental
altruism increases the amount of self-control exercised by the parents, especially so if
children observe parents' behaviour in the later stages of parents' lives.
A potential way to advance this chapter would be to investigate different inheritance
mechanisms for the discount rates between parents and children. In particular, our
inheritance mechanism leaves the distribution of types the same across generations, but
it may be curious to see if an alternative transmission mechanism could lead to evolution
of distribution of types over generations, and ultimately a steady state independent of
the initial distribution of types.
7 Appendix A
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
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Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1 in Benabou and Tirole. Suppose
the strategy profile S* is played, and consider the agent's choice in period 2. At the
end of the second period, t = 2, r = 2, only the strong types, with > /?*, persevere.
Then, since b < ~ < B — c, an agent will only attempt willpower at the beginning of
the second period, t = 2, r = 1, if he is sufficiently confident of being a strong type
and persevering at the end of the period, i.e. p\ = Pr(/3j > f3* \ A\=l) > p*2 — ,
where p\ solves p*2{B - c) + (1 - p*2)b = as before.
7
Suppose agents' beliefs at the beginning of period 2 are in fact: Pr(/^ > /3* | A\=1) =
\ F(3*)
1_F0-) and 1_p0) - by condition (3.2), i.e. the informativeness constraint is
satisfied. Then, consider the agent's choice at t — 1, r = 2. With monotonic beliefs,
it is again the dominant strategy for the strong types to persevere. If , according to
S*, willpower is chosen with probability one at t = 2, r = 1 if P was observed in the
first period, and with zero probability otherwise, all agents with ^ e [/3,/3*), where
(3 — B^h+8{b-a)' a^so have an incentive to persevere as B — jj- + 5b > b + 5a for all
Pi > P-
Therefore, the strategy profile S* is optimal given beliefs are high enough to sat¬
isfy the informativeness constraint. It remains to check that beliefs are correct in
equilibrium.
If, according to S*, all agents with /3j > $ persevered at t — 1, r = 2, then the
updated beliefs at t = 2, r = 1 following perseverance would be:
p2p = Pr(& > P* | Aj=i = P)= (7.1)
And following giving up:
p? = Pr(&>0'|4=i = G) = O (7.2)
Condition (3.2) ensures that equilibrium second period beliefs satisfy the informa¬
tiveness constraint. Otherwise, the second period self-confidence following perseverance
would not be high enough to induce an agent to choose willpower, which cannot be an
equilibrium for the intermediate types as they would only incur a cost, b - (B - -jf-),
from persevering in the first period, if there is a prospect of a gain, 6(b - a), in the
second period.
Finally, at the beginning of period 1, an agent would choose to attempt willpower
if:
(1 -F(P*))(B-c+S(B-c))+ (F(n-FCP))(B-c+Sb) +F0)(b+8a) > ± + 5a (7.3)
The LHS of (7.3) is the ex ante expected payoff to willpower for any agent if S*
is played in equilibrium. The RHS is the overall payoff to no willpower, with the
immediate payoff overweighted by 7. If initial beliefs are such that agents are sufficiently
confident of persevering should they attempt willpower, i.e. (7.3) holds, then willpower
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is initially attempted by all agents. Otherwise, no-one attempts willpower and rhere
is a pooling equilibrium on NW.
Given that in the semi-separating equilibrium, S* is played by the population and
beliefs are updated according to S*, no agent j can profitably deviate. The strong
types have a dominant strategy and will always persevere, regardless of initial or pos¬
terior beliefs, and regardless of other types' actions. The weak types also have a
dominant strategy and will never persevere, as even the prospect of willpower with
certainty in period 2 is not enough to overcome their low discount rates in period 1.
All the intermediate types already persevere in the proposed equilibrium, and since
perseverance yields greater payoff when followed by willpower than giving up, it cannot
be profitable for the intermediate types to deviate by giving up, nor by choosing no
willpower following perseverance.
Therefore, since the actions of all types according to S* are sequentially rational
and beliefs are correct in equilibrium given S*. we have a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.2 with the following amend¬
ment. Suppose the strategy profile Sm* is played and at t = 2, r = 1, agents play
willpower with probability p2 conditional on observing perseverance in the first period,
and with zero probability otehrwise Then, at t — 1, r = 2, for any /3j < /?*, persevering
yields B - c//3j + 8{p2b + (1 ~P2)a), and giving up yields b + Sa. We need to determine
the last agent to persevere in the first period, call him /?', and the probability with
which willpower is chosen in the second period, p2-
First, in order for an agent to randomise at t = 2, r = 1, he must be indifferent
between willpower and no willpower, i.e. his posterior self-confidence must be exactly
p\. Therefore, the last agent to persevere in the first period must be such /?' that solves
the informativeness constraint with equality:
= D* (7 4)
1—F(/3') ^2 G-TI
Second, in order for such equilibrium to be deviation-proof, no agent with (3i < P'
must have an incentive to persevere. Therefore, at t — 2, t — 1, the agent must
randomise with such probability P2 which makes fi' the last agent who has the incentive
to persevere in the first period. Specifically, p2 must solve: B-c//3'+S(p2b+(l-p2)a) =
b + Sa. Therefore,
b—B+c/fi'
VI = <5(6—a) (7-5)
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Then, by construction, no agent with Pi < f3' has an incentive to deviate by perse¬
vering.
Can any agent do better by giving up? Recall that by construction, 110 agent below
13 has an incentive to persevere even if perseverance leads to willpower being chosen
with probability one in period two. Since in the proposed mixed equilibrium, willpower
is only played with probability p2 in period two, the reputational stake is smaller than
in the pure equilibrium, and therefore, it must be the case that p' > f3. Otherwise, all
agents with /?' < Pi < /3 would do better by giving up (also, P2 would be negative).
Since in this equilibrium, the agent is indifferent between willpower and no willpower
in period two, he cannot profitably deviate at t = 2, r = 1 either.
Finally, if Sm* is played, an agent would have an incentive to attempt willpower at
t = 1, r = 1 if the expected payoff to willpower is greater than the expected payoff to
no willpower:
(1 - F(P*))(B -c + S(P2(B - c) + (1 -p2)a)) + (F(f3*) - F(p'))(B - c + 5{p2b + (1 - p2)a))
(7.6)
+F(P')(b + 8a) >* + 6a
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3-4
Proof. Suppose condition (4.3) holds and all agents attempt willpower in the first pe¬
riod. We already know from Proposition 3.2 that the strategy profile Sf is sequentially
rational, provided the informativeness constraint is satisfied. From Proposition 3.3,
we can easily deduce that the strategy SG is also sequentially rational if the informa¬
tiveness constraint is satisfied. Therefore, it remains to show that when the strategy
profile is played, the informativeness constraint is satisfied for children of
both persevering and giving up parents.
Consider the second period beliefs of the children's generation. Firstly, giving up in
the first period means that the agent cannot be a strong type, regardless of his parents'
actions, meaning that agent's second period beliefs would be:
pG = Pr(/32i > P* | A* 1>r=2 = G) = 0 (7.7)
Secondly, under S)f, children of persevering parents themselves persevere if /32i > P
so that their updated second period beliefs, conditional on observing P in the first
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period, would be:
P7= Pr(& > FI At,,„2= P, 4i,,„2 = P) = ' (7.8)
= - (1 - e)F(i»)
Since we assumed that the informativeness constraint was satisfied in generation 1,
\-Fp0) — ^2> informativeness constraint will necessarily be satisfied for persevering
children of persevering parents:
[P> > p*2 (7.9)1 -F(/3)
Thirdly, for children of giving up parents, two scenarios can arise. Suppose children
of giving-up parents play according to pure strategy equilibrium at t = 1, r = 2. Then,
according to S2, their updated second period beliefs following P in the first period
would be:
p?G = Pr(/32t > /3* | A=1,r=2 = P, l,r=2 =G)= (1"?l1;gr)) (7-10)
This can only be an equilibrium if the informativeness constraint holds:
, (7.n)1—F(/3) - H2 v '
If (7.8) does not hold, then we know from Proposition 3.3 that there cannot be a
pure equilibrium (beliefs are not high enough for all intermediate types to persevere,
and a strategy where some or none of the intermediate types persevere is not deviation
proof when willpower is chosen with probability one in the second period). In that
case, according to S2, children of giving up parents play mixed: at t = 1, r = 2, they
persevere for all f32i > /?"; at t = 2, r = 1, they choose willpower with probability
p2 — ) where /3" solves the informativeness constraint with equality:
p?G = Pr(/?2j > F I A=1,t=2 = P, A=l,r=2 = G) = (1~^y)) = P*2 (7.12)
Finally, consider the agent's choice at the beginning of the game, at t = 1, r = 1. It
was optimal for generation 1 to choose willpower in the first period, then it is necessarily
optimal for children of persevering parents to choose willpower as well, since they have
better odds of being a strong type than the underlying distribution. If S2 is played in
equilibrium, children of giving up parents would choose willpower in the first period if:
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(1 - 0)(1 - F(/3*))(B -c + Sp2(B - c) + (1 - p2)a)+ (7.13)
(1 - 0)(F(F) - F(P"))(B - c + S(P2b + (1 - p2)a))
+ {9 + (1 - 0)F(P")](b + 6a) >^ + 6a
The LHS in condition (7.13) above is the expected payoff to choosing willpower
in the first period for a child of giving up parents, given that the mixed strategy
equilibrium is played in period two. The RHS is the payoff to no willpower.
If it is optimal for a child of giving-up parents to attempt willpower under mixed
strategy at t — 2, r = 1, it will also be optimal to attempt willpower if pure strategy is
expected. ■
8 Appendix B
8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. Suppose the strategy profile {S^; Sp, SG} is played.
Step 1. Consider the parents' generation. The t = 2 payoffs are unaffected by
the introduction of empathy, so at t = 2, r = 2 only the strong types, with f3u > f3*,
persevere; and at t = 2, r = 1, agents attempt willpower only if their self-confidence is
above the threshold p\. Consider what happens at t = 1, r — 2. For the strong types,
according to Sf, perseverance P yields B —^ + S(B — c) + p,E[u2i(S2P) \ f3u > (3*, P],
and giving up G yields b + Sa + fiE[u2i(S2G) \ f}u > /3*,G]. The expectations over
the child's utility, E[u2i{S2P) \ (3U > /3*,P] and E[u2i{S2G) j /3U > (3*,G], are taken
from the strong type parent's perspective at t = 1, r = 2, given that children play the
strategy profile {Sp,SG}-
As long as E[u2i(S2P) \ /3ti > /3*,P] > E[u2i(S2G) | > /3*,G], it remains the
dominant strategy for the strong types to persevere.
For any /3U < (3*, according to Sf, persevering yields B - + 5b + pLE[u2i(S2P) |
(3U < (3*, P], and giving up yields b + 5a + p,E[u2i(S2G) \ /3U < (3*, G\. By continuity,
there exists some ^ parent who is indifferent between P and G :
— c
B-b + 5(b-a) + ii(E[u2l(S2P) \p,P}-E[u2i(S2G) \0,G\) (8'1}
Since, by construction, ]3 is the last parent who wishes to persevere under altruism
conditional on willpower being chosen with certainty upon observing P in period two,
no agent with /3U < ft would have the incentive to deviate from Sf by persevering.
Similarly, since we assume that the informativeness constraint is satisfied in parents'
generation, > Pb n0 a§ent with ^ P can do better by giving up or playing a
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mixed strategy, since for such agents, P yields a strictly higher payoff than G at t — 1,
t — 2, and willpower is already chosen with probability one at t = 2, r = 1, conditional
on observing perseverance, which attains the maximum reputational stake.
Then, to show that Sf is optimal, we need to show that E[u2i{S2P) | (3U > /?, P] >
E[u2i{S2G) | (3U > /3, G], which would also imply that /? < /3 = — -.
B — b + o(b — a)
Step 2. Consider the children's generation. For children of persevering parents,
their initial beliefs are:
pY = Pr(/32i > r I ALi,t=2 = P) = O'-YYv + ^ -6- FW (8-2)
And for children of giving up parents:
pT - Pr(/32l > r I >4" 1iT=2 = G) = (1 - 6)( 1 - F(/3*)) (8.3)
The initial beliefs of children of persevering parents are actually somewhat lower
under empathy since children take into account that a larger proportion of parents
persevere in order to induce 'good' beliefs in their children. Still, since children of per¬
severing parents have higher initial beliefs than their parents, and the parents already
play the best possible strategy given ^ ch^dren cannot do better than
persevere for j32j > $, and play willpower with probability one in period two, conditional
on observing perseverance, which is exactly what Sp prescribes. More so, if children
of persevering parents play according to Sp, their updated second period beliefs must
elSw+(1"e)(1"F(r))
necessarily satisfy the informativeness constraint, since *■' ' 1_F^ > p\ if
l-F(P') > n*
1 -F(P) - P?"
The initial beliefs of children of giving up parents are the same as they were without
empathy, thus they cannot do better than play according to SG■ Recall that if condition
(7.13) holds, these children will attempt willpower, persevere if /?2i > (3", and select
willpower with probability p2 in the second period upon observing P. Otherwise, they
do not attempt willpower.
Step 3. Find the expected children's utility when the strategy profile {Sf; Sp, 5"^}
is played.
Mixed Equilibrium. Consider first the case in which children of giving up parents
have sufficient self-confidence to attempt willpower.
If a strong type parent perseveres, the parent's expectation of his offspring's utility,
provided child plays according to Sp, will be:
E[u2l(S2P) | > 13*, P] = (0 + (1 - 0)( 1 - F(F)))(B — c + 8(B — c)) (8.4)
+(1 - 0)(F(p*) - F0))(B - c + 5b) + (1 - d)F0)(b + 5a)
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If a strong type parent gives up, the parent's expectation of his offspring's utility,
according to SG, will be:
E[u2i(S2G) | 0U > (3*, G} = {0 + (1- 0)(1 - F(/3*)))(B - c + 6(p2(B - c) + (1 - p2)a))
(8.5)
+(1 - 9)(F((3*) - F((3"))(B - c + S(P2b + (1 - p2)a)) + (1 - 0)F(P")(b + 6a)
From (8.4) and (8.5), it is clear that E[u2i(S2G) | (3U > f3*,G] < E[u2i(S2P) |
Pu > P*, P}- The first term on the RHS of (8.5) is smaller than the first term on RHS
of (8.4) as B — c + S(p2b + (1 — p2)a) < B — c + 5(B — c). The sum of the second
and the third terms on the RHS of (8.5) is also smaller than the corresponding sum
in (8.4) as the former attaches a higher weight to a smaller payoff, F((3") > F((3) and
b + 6a < B — c+ 5(p2b+ (l—p2)a) < B — c+Sb. Thus, it remains the dominant strategy
for the strong type to persevere at t — 1, r = 2.
If an intermediate parent with (3^ G [/?,/?*) perseveres, the expected utility of his
child, according to Sp, will be:
E(u2i(S2P) | /3U e 0, F),P) = {l- 6){ 1 - F(/3*))(B -c + S(B- c)) (8.6)
+{6 + (1 - 9)(F{/3*) - F0)))(B -c + Sb) + ( 1 - 9)F0)(b + Sa)
And if such parent gives up:
E(u2l(S2G) | (3lt 6 0,(3*), G) = (1 - 9)( 1 - F((3*)){B - c + 5(p2(B - c) + (1 - p2)a))
(8.7)
+(9 + (1 - 9)(F((3*) - F(f3")))(B - c + S(p2b + (1 - p2)a)) + (1 - 6)F(j3")(b + 6a)
By the same logic as with the children of strong types, it is clear from (8.6) and
(8.7) that E(u2i(S2P) | (3U G 0,(3*),P) > E{u2i(S2G) \ (3U G 0,/3*),G) . Therefore,
it remains optimal for parents with (3U > (3 to persevere at t = l,r = 2 and moreover,
the last parent to persevere must be below the (3 threshold, i.e. (3 < (3.
Then, for parents with (3U G 0,(3), who would not have persevered without empa¬
thy, the expectation of children's utility will be:
E(u2i(S2P) | G 0, P),P) = ( 1 - 9){ 1 - F{p)){B — c + 5(B — c)) (8.8)
+(1 - 9)(F((3*) - F0))(B - c + Sb) + (9 + (1 - 9)F0))(b + 6a)
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And if Pu G \P,P) parents give up:
E(u2i(S2G, G) | pu G [3,3)) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(p*))(B - c + 5(p2(B - c) + (1 - p2)a))
(8.9)
+(1 - e)(F(P*) - F(/3"))(B - c + S(p2b + (1 - p2)a)) + (9 + (1 - 6)F{p")){b + 5a)
Once again, E(u2i(S2P) j /3U G [/?,/?),-P) > E(u2i(S2G) | /3U G [/?,/?),£). It is also
the case that E(u2j{S2P) \ Pu < /3,P) = E(u2i(S2P) | (3U G \(3,P),P), even though
this is off the equilibrium path, and E(u2i(S2G) \ Pu < p, G) = E(u2i(S2G) \ Pu G
iP,P),G).
To determine /3, we compute the expected gain in child welfare from the P parent
persevering:
E{u2i{S2P) \P,P)~ E{u2l{S2G) | fi,G)= (8.10)
= (1 _ 61)5(1 _ p2)[(i _ F(p*))(B - c - a) + (F(p*) - F(P"))(b - a)]
+(1 - 0)(F(P") - F(P))(B - c-b + 6(b-a))
Therefore,
P = c{B - b + 5(b - a) + M1 ~ (9)[tf(l - p2)[(l - ^(r))(5 - c - a) + (F(p*) - F(/3"))(& -
(8.11)
(F(P") - F(P))(B — c - b + 5(b — a))]}"1
This P identifies the lowest parent who is willing to persevere if willpower is played
with probability one following perseverance in period two. All agents with P < /3 will
give up at t — 1, r = 2.
Then at t — 1, r = 1, parents will attempt willpower if the expected payoff to W
exceeds the expected payoff to NW :
(1 - F(p*))(B — c + 5(B — c) + /aE(u2i(S2P) | pu > /3*, P) (8.12)
+(F(P*) - F0))(B ~c + 5b + pE(u2i(S2P) | P1 G [P, P*),P)
+(F(P) - F0))(B -c + 5b + pE(u2i(S2P) | p1 G [p, P), P)
+F(P)(b + 5a + pE(u2i(S2G) | Pu < P, G) > f + 8a + pE(u?w)
where E(u^w) is the expected utility of children, whose parents did not attempt
willpower.
Condition (8.12) can also be written as:
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F(f3*))(B -c + 6(B -c)) + (F(/3*) - F0))(B -c + 5b) + F0)(b + 5a) (8.13)




(1 -F(p))(B-c + 6(B-c))
+(F(/3*) - F0))(B - c + 5b) + F0){b + 5a)
(1 - F((3*))(B - c + 5(p2(B - c) + (1 ~P2)a))
+(F(/3*) - F(/3"))(B - c + 5{p2b + (1 - pfja)) + F((3")(b + 5a)
(1 - F(/3*))(B — c + 5(B — c)) + (F{6*) - F0))(B -c + 5b) + F0)(b + 5a)
> ~ + 5a + nE(uNW \**C )
It remains to determine E{u^w). If the information node in which no parents
attempt willpower at t = 1, r = 1 is reached, the equilibrium is a pooling one. If all
parents choose NW, no additional information about parent's type is revealed to the
children. Therefore, children would have the same initial beliefs as their parents; then
it must be the case that if parents found it optimal to choose NW, so will the children
if they have the same initial beliefs. Thus, E{u^w) = (1 + 5)a.
Pure Equilibrium. Finally, consider the case in which the self-confidence of
children of giving up parents is not sufficient for them to attempt willpower. In this
case, the expected utility of a child of a giving up parent, regardless of parent's type,
would be:
£(ucG) = (l + 5)a (8.14)
According to Assumption 1, some self-control is better than none, thus in terms
of payoffs, this is the worst outcome for the children. This decline in children's utility
from parents' giving up should provide an extra incentives for the parents to persevere,
and so the last intermediate parent to persevere in this case will be some /?' < /?. ■
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.7.
Proof. Suppose agents in all generations play a stationary strategy profile {SeP, SeG}.
If we can find such /?", /3 and f°r which {S'eP,5eG} is sequentially rational and
show that beliefs are consistent with {S'e'P,S'eG} in each generation, then we will have
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Step 1. Take any generation k. Behaviour in period two is the same as in the
two-generation case: only the strong types persevere at the end of the game and only
those agents with the updated second period beliefs above the p*2 threshold attempt
willpower at t — 2, r = 1, at least with some probability. Consider what happens
at t — 1, r = 2 when {S'eP,S'eG} is played. For children of persevering parents with
Pki > persevering yields B - c/(3ki + 5{B - c) + pVk+i^{/3ki > P*,P), and giving
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up yields b + 6a + pVk^i^(0ki P P* ,G). Similarly, for children of persevering parents
with 0ki < 0*, persevering yields B — c//3ki + Sb + pVk+i^(0ki < 0*, P), and giving up
yields b + 6a + p,Vk+i^(0ki < /3*,G). By continuity, there exists an agent ~0ki who is
indifferent between persevering and giving up:
/3ki ~ B~b+S{b-a)+n[Vk+l<i{0P)-Vk+1,SP)\ ^'15^
To find ~0ki,we need to find VW(P, P)-Vk+lii(~0, G). UVk+u(0, P)-Vk+u{0, G) >
0, then 0ki < 0, and all children of persevering parents with 0kj > 0ki will have the
incentive to persevere at t = 2, r = 1, as long as their updated second period beliefs
elz£iO+ (i_0)(i_F(/3»))
satisfy the informativeness constraint, i.e. — > pi, where \k-i is1—F(P)
the proportion of agents persevering in generation k — 1.
For children of giving up parents, if ^ > p\, they play the same strategy
as children of persevering parents. If, ^ < p\, then the last agent to
persevere at t = 1, r = 2 is 0", which solves ^ = p\- Since the threshold
p*2 is unchanged, ft" is the same in this equilibrium as in the two generations and no
empathy case. For SG to be deviation-proof, 0" must be the last child of giving-
up parents who has an incentive to persevere, i.e. he must be indifferent between
persevering, which yields him B - c/ft" + bip^b + (1 — p|)a) + pVk+i(P", P), and giving
up, which yields b + ba + pVk+\{0", G). Therefore, p% must be:
e
= b-B+c//3"-n\Vk+1(P",P)-Vk+1(l3",G)] ,g ^"2 5(6—a) A • J
To find p|i we must find Vk+\(0", P) — Vk+i(0",G). Notice that if Vk+\(0",P) -
Vfe+i(f3",G) > 0, P2 < P2, he. the second period probability of choosing willpower for
children of giving up parents is actually lower under empathy.
Step 2. We turn now to determining the expected utility of offsprings, Vk+\ti(0ki,Aki)
Since agents in all generations are assumed to play their best response, we refer to
the expected utility as the expected value functions. Firstly, if a stationary equilib¬
rium strategy is played in the infinite generation context, then Vk+i(Pk, A^=1t=2) =
Vk(Pk-i, ^t=i,r=2) = v(P'At=i,r=2) Vi,fc, as long as 0k = 0k_x = 0 and A\=X t=2 =
At~iT=2 = j4t=i)T=2, he. the expected value function for future generations is inde¬
pendent of a particular generation number; it is a function of a state, defined by two
variables - the type of parent, 0, and the t = 1, r = 2 action of the parent, A.
Then we can write the expected utility, or value function, of a child of 0 parent who
had persevered as:
101
V0, P) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(0*))(B - c + 8(B-c) + pV(0 > 00 P)) (8.17)
+(6 + (1 - d)(F(0*) - F(0)))(B - c + 5b + pV{0 < 0 < 0*, P))
+(1 - 6)F{0){b + Sa + pV(0 < 0, G))
where V(0 > 0*, P)) is the value of being a child of a strong and persevering parent,
V{0 0 0 < 0*, P)) is the value of a child of an intermediate parent with 0 < 0 < 0*,
who had also persevered, and V(0 < 0, G) is the value function for the child of a weak
giving up parent. Then the value function for a child of a 0 parent who had given up
is:
V{0, G) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(0*))(B - c + 6(pe2(B - c) + (1 - pl)a) + > 0\ P))
(8.18)
+ (1 - e)(F(0*) - F(0"))(B - c + b{V\b + (1 - p\)a) + pV(0" < 0 < 0*, P))
+(6 + (1 - e)F{0")){b + Sa + p,V{0 < 0", G))
Similarly, for a child of 0" parent who had persevered, the value function can be
written as:
V(0", P) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(0*))(B - c + 5(B - c) + pV{0 > 0*, P)) (8.19)
+(0 + (1 - 9){F{0*) - F(0)))(B -c + 5b + pV (0 <0< 0\P))
+(1 - e)F(~0){b + Sa + pV{0 < ~0, G))
And if the 0" had given up:
V(0", G) = (1 - 0)( 1 - F{0*))(B - c + S(pe2(B - c) + (1 - pe2)a) + pV{0 > 00 P))
(8.20)
+(6»+ (1 - O)(F{0*) - F(0")))(B -c + 5{p2b+(l-p2)a) + pV(0" < 0 < 0*,P))
+(1 - d)F{0")(b + Sa + pV{0 < 0", G))
Conditional on parent's action, the value function is a step function of the parent's
type. It is easy to see that
V(0 > 00 P) >V{0<0< 00 P) - V(0" <0<00P) (8.21)
and
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V(/3 > P*,G) > V{/3" < P < P*,G) > V(/3 < p < P*,G) = V(P < p", G) = V(P < 0, G)
(8.22)
With this in mind, we can write:
V(P", P) - V(p", G) = 5(1 - v\) [(1 - 0)( 1 - F(p*))(B - c - a) + (1 - 9)(F(p*) - F(p")(b - a)]
(8.23)
+(1 - 6){F{p") - F0))(B — c — b + 5(b — a) + fi(V(P", P) - V(/3", G)) + 96(1 - pe2)(b - a)
V(P, P) - V0, G) = 5(1 - p§) [(1 - (9)(1 - F(P*))(B - c - a) + (1 - 6)(F(p*) - F(p")(b - a)]
(8.24)
+(1 - 9)(F(P") - F(P))(B - c - b + 6(b - a) + fx(V(~P, P) - V("P, G))
+6(B — c — b + S(b — a) + fi(V0, P) - V0, G))
„e _ b-B+c/P"-n\VU3",P)-V(p",G)] 9_>
Solving equations (8.24) and (8.25) simultaneously to find p?2, and substituting back
into equation (8.23) gives:
V(P", P) - V(P", G) = (B — b — c/P" +6(b-a))J^s + (l-9) (F(P") - F(^))c^T^y
(8.26)
V(P, P) - V0, G) = (B — b — c/P" + 5(6 -a))^ (8.27)
+(1 - 9)(F(P ) -F(p))c+ /3''(i_M0_M(i_0)(jF(,3'')_F(ja)))
B-6-c//J"+5(6-a)+/i(l-0)(F(/3")-J'(/3))ci1J^
1 - P2 = J(6-a)(l-^) ^ (8.28)
where Z? = 9 + (1 - 9)(F(P*) - F(p)) + (1 - 9)( 1 - F(P*))Mf^.
Then use equation (8.27) to find P :
P — c
B-b-cb—c//S"+S(b—a) , _c_ f i i (i _ Q)(F(P") - F(3)) , ^ -| ^{1-/3")
1-y.D + /3" 1/ + ^ a)\r\P> yP>> {1-nD)) + (l-/1e-/1(l-0)(F(^")-F(3)))
(8.29)
By the same argument as in the case of two generations, F(/3, P) -V(P,G) > 0 for
-i
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all /3 (V(P,P) attaches higher weight to higher payoffs), therefore, ~(3 < ft and p2 < Vi■
Step3. We now find the proportion of the population that perseveres in the long
run. Since all generations play a stationary strategy, this is equivalent to the case of
infinite generations without empathy, but with /? instead of 0. Therefore,




k^oo k 1 -(F(P")-F0))
and limfe^oo X% > lim^^ Xk.
2 F(B"} ~It is clear that
1 F(]3)) < ^ ~ so informativeness constraint is
always satisfied for children of persevering parents.
Step 4. Condition (5.4) guarantees that children of giving-up parents have suffi¬
cient self-confidence to attempt willpower in the first period. It is possible to calculate
the value functions explicitly, although for the sake of saving space, we leave the condi¬
tion (5.4) in its value function form, which also simplifies the exposition. If condition
(5.4) did not hold, so that children attempted no willpower at the beginning of the
game, there could still be a pure equilibrium of the kind described in multiple genera¬
tions without empathy case.
2 F(B*)
It is also clear that under the assumption i ' > p2, generation one have suf¬
ficiently high initial and posterior beliefs to play the same strategy as the children of
persevering parents. ■
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. Suppose the strategy profile, {Sfp; S2W, SG, S2} is played. We need to
show that this strategy profile is sequentially rational given beliefs, and that beliefs are
correct in equilibrium.
Step 1: Consider the parents' problem at t = 2, r = 2. For a f3u parent, persever¬
ing yields B - c//3lz + pE[u%p(S2P) | /3U,P], and giving up yields b + p,E[u%f{S2G) \
(3u,G]. By continuity, there exists some (3** parent who is indifferent between P and
G at t — 2, r = 2 :
c
r =
B-b + p(E[upp(S2P)\r,P]-E[uiP(S2G)\/3**,G}) (8'31)
All parents with (3U > f3** will find it optimal to persevere at t = 2, r = 2.
Then at t = 2, r = 1, choosing willpower yields p2(B - c + pE[u%f (S2P) \ (3U >
/3**,P])+(l-p2){b+ pE[u2p{S2G) | f3u < P**,G])\and not attempting willpower yields
a/7 + pE[v%f{SNW) | p2,NW], where p2 = Pr{Pu > /3** \ A\l=l T=2,pt=1). Then,
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parents will choose to attempt willpower at t = 2, r = 1 if their updated second period
beliefs satisfy the new informativeness constraint: Pr^^ > fi** | A\l=1 r=2, Pt=\) > P2*>
where
D** = *ll-b+v{EMr{SNW)\p?,NW]-E[u!;f{S*G)\pu<t3*\G)) ,RP2 B-c-b+p(E\u^{S^)\Pii>P*\P)-E[u^{S^)\pli<l3",G}) >
The threshold level of self-confidence, p**, makes the parent indifferent between W
and NW at t = 2, r = 1, taking into account the expected welfare of the children.
Then, at t = 1, r = 2, under the strategy profile {Spp~, S2W, S2 , Sp}, giving up
yields b + S(a + pE[u2f (SNW) \ fiu , AW) for any fiu. On the other hand, persevering
yields B - c/fin + 5(B - c + pE[u%p(S2P) \ fiu > fi**, P}) for fiu > fi** and B -
c/fin + S(b + pElu^f (S2G) | fiu < fi**,G]) for fiu < fi**. Suppose fi** > fi, then the
last parent who has an incentive to persevere is
B - b + S(b - a) + Sp(E[ugp{S2G) \ fiLP,G] - E[u^p{SNW) \ fiLP,NW})
(8.33)
For the purpose of generating a pure strategy equilibrium in generation 1, we assume
that 1-F^p > P2*. Then, all parents with fiXi > fiLP persevere at t = 1, t = 2,1 -F(/3 )
- LP
parents with fiu < fi give up, and no-one has an incentive to deviate.
From (8.33), fiLP < fi if E[uiP{S2G) | fiLP,G} > E[u^p(SNW) \ fiLP,NW}. Below
we find the relative sizes of children's expected utilities given parental actions, and
therefore find the relative magnitude/? and fi** compared to fi, and of p" compared
to p*2.
Step 2: Consider the initial beliefs of generation two. Since generation two do not
themselves have children, they play according to the same strategy as the no-altruism
case. Once again, children of persevering parents have higher initial beliefs than their
parents, which implies they have sufficient self-confidence to attempt willpower and
persevere, conditional on type, whenever their parents did so:
P2lp,i = Pr^2z > r I A=2 = P) = + (1 - 0){ 1 - F{fi*)) (8.34)
Therefore, children of persevering parents cannot do better than play according to
Sp, and their expected utility is the same as in Proposition 3.6, E[u2p(S2P) | fiu, P} =
E[u2fiS2P)\fiu,P] = E(up\fili)-
The initial beliefs of children of giving up parents are:
pTp.i = pr(/?2i > /?* I 4=2 = G) = (1 - 0)(1 - F(fi*)) (8.35)
Since children can deduce that, according to S^p, only parents with fiu < fiL ,
who had given up in the first period, do not attempt willpower in the second period,
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the initial beliefs of children whose parents did not attempt willpower are the same as
the initial beliefs of children whose parents gave up at the end of the second period:
AT = Pr(^ > P* I A]U = NW) - (1 - 0)(1 - F{P*)) = P2\°pi (8.36)
Since children of giving up and of not attempting willpower parents have the same
initial beliefs, (8.35) and(8.36), they cannot do better than play according to the strat-
egy S§, and therefore the expected utility of such children is again as in Proposition
3.6, E[uiP(S2G) | pu,G] = E[uiP(SNW) | PU.,NW) = E(ug \ Pu).
However, we have already shown in the proof of Proposition (3.6) that if children
play according to {Sp,Sg}, then E(ug \ Pu) > E(ug | Pu) for all Pu.





P2 R-r-h4-„.( .u,.y?(^ P2 (8.38)
P**
B — b + p{E[upp{S2P) | f3**, P} - E[uiP{S2G) | /?**, G]) < " (8'39)
Finally, at t = 1, r = 1, parents attempt willpower if:
(1 - F(D)(B - C+S(B - c + pE[uiP(S2P) I pu > P**,P})) (8.40)
+(F(P**) - F0)){B -c + 5(b + pE[uiP(S2G) \P<PU< P*\ G])) (8.41)
+F(P){b + 5a + pE[uiP(SNW) | Pu. < P, NW)) >± + 5a + pE{u»wl)
As before, we can assume that E{u^wi) - (1 + S)a, and so for any 'reasonable'
payoffs, condition (8.40) should hold trivially.
Recall that we assumed that P** > P, however it is possible that for p(E[u^f (S2P) |
P**, P] - E[ugp(S2G) | P**,G}) > 5{b - a), P** < p. This happens if:
^[(1 _ 0)^(1 _ P2)[(i - F(p*))(B — c — a) + (F(P*) - F(P"))(b - a)]
+(1 - 6){F{P") - F(P))(B - c-b + 6(b - a))] > 6{b - a)
In this case, all parents with Pu > P** persevere in both periods, as long as
- P*2' Equilibrium strategies remain unchanged otherwise. ■
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